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COMMENT
IN THE STREET TONIGHT1: AN EQUAL PROTECTION
ANALYSIS OF BALTIMORE CITY’S JUVENILE CURFEW
By: Andrew Middleman2
INTRODUCTION
I. SINKING SUNS: CURFEWS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARYLAND, AND
BALTIMORE
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CURFEW LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CURFEW LAWS IN MARYLAND
1. Curfews in Other Maryland Counties and Municipalities
2. Maryland’s Highest Court Upholds One Local Curfew
and Invalidates Another
3. An Emergency Curfew in Baltimore City Is Challenged
C. BALTIMORE CITY’S JUVENILE CURFEW
1. Defining the Curfew and Its General Prohibitions
2. The Curfew’s Time and Place Restrictions
a. The Daytime Curfew
b. The Nighttime Curfew
3. Enforcing the Curfew
a. Enforcing the Curfew Against Minors
b. Enforcing the Curfew Against Parents
D. THE BALTIMORE CITY COUNCIL’S INTERESTS UNDERLYING ITS
CURFEW
1. Explicit Policies: Reducing Juvenile Crime and
Delinquency, and Promoting Education
a. The Baltimore City Council’s Legislative
Findings
b. The Baltimore City Council’s Legislative Intent
1

This Comment derives its title from a song entitled “In the Street, Today,” which
was written and performed by The Jam. Though released in 1977—nearly forty
years before Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew ordinance took effect—the song’s
depictions of crime, paranoia, and adolescent restlessness squarely describe the
impetus for the curfew. THE JAM, In the Street, Today, on THIS IS THE MODERN
WORLD (Polydor Records 1977).
2
The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to Professor C.J. Peters,
Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law, for his insightful notes to
previous drafts of this Comment, and for his guidance and encouragement
throughout the researching, writing, and editing processes.
Special thanks to Patrick Toohey, Editor-in-Chief, University of Baltimore Law
Forum, for his thoughtful editing of later drafts, and for his flexibility throughout the
production process. In addition, thank you to David Schult for his feedback on
earlier drafts, and to Deborah Richardson and Lauren M. Vint for critiquing other
iterations of this Comment.
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2. Implicit Policies: Encouraging Parents to Take a More
Active Role in Raising Their Children
II. ANALYZING BALTIMORE CITY’S JUVENILE CURFEW UNDER THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
A. ARTICULATING THE STANDARDS OF SCRUTINY
1. Strict Scrutiny
2. Intermediate Scrutiny
3. Rational Basis Review
a. Traditional Rational Basis Review
b. Rational Basis Review “With Teeth”
4. Inconsistency in Analyzing Juvenile Curfew Ordinances
B. THE CURFEW’S AGE-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS: COMPARING
RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW AGAINST INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
1. Legitimate and Important Government Interests:
Reducing Juvenile Crime and Victimization
2. Applying Rational Basis Review
3. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny
4. Assessing the Curfew’s Effects on Reducing Juvenile
Crime and Victimization
C. THE CURFEW’S RACE-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS: TRIGGERING
STRICT SCRUTINY
1. Triggering Strict Scrutiny for Facially Neutral Laws
2. Proving Racially Discriminatory Purpose
3. Proving Racially Discriminatory Impact
a. The Youth Connection Centers: “The pattern
surrounding curfew laws has been to enact them
in blighted, poor, urban areas[.]”
b. Enforcing the Curfew Against Minority Children
III. APPLYING THE EQUAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK TO BALTIMORE
CITY’S JUVENILE CURFEW
A. RECONCILING THE CURFEW’S CLASSIFICATIONS WITH THE
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
B. ACCURATELY ASSESSING REDUCTIONS IN JUVENILE CRIME AND
VICTIMIZATION
C. PROPOSING ALTERNATIVE MEANS TO ADVANCE OR ACHIEVE
THE CURFEW’S UNDERLYING POLICIES
1. Employing the Kids
2. Incorporating the Curfew into the Juvenile Justice System
3. Continuing to Develop Robust Recreation Programs
4. Adopting Boston’s Strategy
CONCLUSION
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INTRODUCTION
The sun is setting on a late-August evening in Baltimore. Children are
playing in the gym at an elementary school in Berea, a small neighborhood in
East Baltimore. Ulysses Cofield is watching the clock.3 Cofield keeps the
Fort Worth Elementary School gym open late so the neighborhood kids have
a place to blow off steam at the end of the day.4 At 8:30 p.m., he tells a pair
of ten-year-olds they must leave so they can be home within the next thirty
minutes.5 Cofield closes the gym for the evening, then scans the block for
lingering children; he wants to order the children home before police do.6 This
anecdote hardly is unique7—the result of Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew
ordinance,8 which took effect in August 2014.9
The ordinance subjects minors to both “nighttime” and “daytime”
curfews.10 Both curfews prohibit minors from “remain[ing] in or about any
public place or establishment”11 during specified hours, depending on the
3

Julia Botero, For Their Own Good? New Curfew Sends Baltimore Kids Home
Early, NPR (Aug. 31, 2014, 1:33 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/08/31/
344643559/for-their-own-good-new-curfew-sends-baltimore-kids-home-early.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
In Collington Square Park, another East Baltimore neighborhood, children ask:
“What time is my curfew?”; “What if I’m out with my brother and he’s 18?”; “If I
hide, can I still stay out and play?” Edith Honan, Go home kids: Baltimore launches
strict evening curfew for youth, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/go-home-kids-baltimore-launches-strictevening-curfew-for-youth/2014/08/09/197f7f9e-1ff8-11e4-ab7b696c295ddfd1_story.html.
In yet another Baltimore neighborhood, fifteen-year-old Isaiah Jackson and his
friends wait until dusk to play basketball under the nocturnal glow of the streetlights,
which illuminates a makeshift court in an alley near his home. Emma Fitzsimmons,
Baltimore Joins Cities Toughening Curfews, Citing Safety but Eliciting Concern,
N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/22/us/baltimorejoins-cities-toughening-curfews-citing-safety-but-eliciting-concern.html. But
Jackson worries that he and his friends will attract attention from police officers who
are looking for curfew violators. Id.
8
For the full text of the curfew, see BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art.
19, subtit. 34, at 79-86, (Balt. City Dep’t of Legislative Reference 2015), available
at http://archive.baltimorecity.gov/portals/0/charter%20and%20Codes/code/Art
%2019%20-%20PoliceOrds.pdf.
9
Council B. 13-0261, Balt. City Council (Balt., Md. 2014) (providing that the
curfew will take effect sixty days after the date on which it is enacted).
10
See BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, §§ 34-3, 34-4. See also
discussion infra Part I.C.
11
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, §§ 34-3(b), 34-3(c)(1), 343(c)(2), 34-4(a).
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minor’s age, the day of the week, and the time of year.12 There are, however,
exceptions to each curfew.13 The curfew further forbids parents “to knowingly
permit or, by insufficient control, to allow” their children to violate the
curfew.14
The curfew is among the strictest in the nation,15 and is unlike any other.
A curfew violation does not subject a minor to civil or criminal penalties.16
Instead, it imposes penalties on the child’s parent.17 A parent who violates the
curfew18 faces issuance of a civil citation,19 or he or she may elect to attend
family counseling sessions with the minor at a city-approved agency.20
Baltimore City’s curfew is sharply divisive; it has sparked controversy and
debate among concerned city officials, community leaders, and citizens.21
Chief among those concerns are the curfew’s constitutional and policy
implications.22 The curfew raises several constitutional issues, namely a
minor’s equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.23

12

See id. §§ 34-3(b), 34-3(c)(1), 34-3(c)(2), 34-4(a).
See id. See also discussion infra Part I.C.2.
14
See BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-5. See also discussion
infra Part I.C.2.
15
See, e.g., Lauren Gambino, Outrage follows Baltimore’s ‘deeply flawed’ youth
curfew decision, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2014, 9:56 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/12/-sp-baltimore-city-council-youthcurfew; Justin Worland, Baltimore Tightens Curfew Amid Skepticism and Protests,
TIME (Aug. 8, 2014), http://time.com/3089931/baltimore-curfew/; Yvonne Wenger
& Colin Campbell, Baltimore's new curfew takes effect Friday, BALTIMORE SUN
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-08-07/news/bs-md-ci-curfeweffective-20140806_1_curfew-collington-square-recreation-center-sandtownwinchester; Fitzsimmons, supra note 7.
16
See generally BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-7.
17
See generally id. § 34-9(a).
18
See generally id. § 34-5. See also discussion infra Part I.C.3.b.
19
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-9(a)(1)(i).
20
Id. § 34-9(a)(1)(ii).
21
See discussion infra Part I.D.2.
22
Luke Broadwater, Council approves tough new curfew for city youths, BALTIMORE
SUN (May 12, 2014, 8:24 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-curfew-20140512-story.html (quoting Sonia
Kumar, an attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland).
The ACLU sent a letter to the Baltimore City Council in opposition of the curfew,
and considered filing a lawsuit to challenge it. See Baltimore’s Tough Curfew Law
Takes Effect, CBSLOCAL.COM (Aug. 8, 2014, 6:22 AM), http://washington.cbs
local.com/2014/08/08/baltimores-tough-curfew-law-takes-effect-today/ (updated
Aug. 9, 2014, 9:53 AM); Fitzsimmons, supra note 7; Broadwater, supra.
23
See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”) See also discussion
infra Parts II and III.
13
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This Comment analyzes Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew under the Equal
Protection Clause.24 Part I provides a brief history of curfew laws in the United
States and Maryland; discusses relevant case law in the Supreme Court of the
United States and the Court of Appeals of Maryland; outlines the curfew’s
restrictions and enforcement strategies; and suggests the legislative policies
underlying the curfew extend beyond those explicitly stated in it.
Part II summarizes the standards of review applicable to an equal protection
analysis; compares various constitutional challenges to juvenile curfews in the
federal courts; and analyzes the age-based classifications in, and the racially
disproportionate effects of, Baltimore City’s curfew.
Part III proposes two independent standards for reviewing Baltimore City’s
curfew: a heightened form of rational basis review for the curfew’s age-based
classifications, and strict scrutiny for the curfew’s racially disproportionate
effects. Part III also offers several alternative means by which the Baltimore
City Council can advance the legislative policies underlying the curfew.
This Comment concludes that Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew will
survive an equal protection attack to its age classifications. This Comment
further concludes that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard to apply to the
curfew’s racially disproportionate effects, but that more data is needed to
properly review the curfew under that standard. Finally, this Comment
concludes that the alternative strategies offered in Part III would more
effectively advance the legislative policies behind the curfew without
offending the Equal Protection Clause.

24

Challenges to juvenile curfew ordinances on other grounds are beyond this
Comment’s scope, but juvenile curfews are vulnerable to myriad constitutional
attacks. See cases cited infra notes 205-10.
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SINKING SUNS: CURFEWS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARYLAND, AND
BALTIMORE
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CURFEW LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES25

Juvenile curfew ordinances began to develop at the turn of the twentieth
century26 out of fear that immigrants would not control their children.27 More
than fifty percent of all cities with 100,000 residents had enacted a juvenile
curfew ordinance by the mid-1950s;28 more than seventy percent of such cities
had done so by the 1990s.29
In the 1990s, municipalities frequently cited rising juvenile crime and
victimization rates as the impetus for their curfews.30 Although juvenile
25

Part I.A. merely offers a cursory glance at the history of curfew laws in the United
States. Cf. Note, Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion over Minor Rights, 118
HARV. L. REV. 2400, 2402 (2005) [hereinafter Major Confusion] (“Juvenile curfews
have deep historical roots.”).
For more comprehensive discussions, see generally id. at 2402-03; Craig
Hemmens & Katherine Bennett, Out in the Street: Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Curfews,
and the Constitution, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 267, 277-85 (1998); Patryk J. Chudy, Note,
Doctrinal Reconstruction: Reconciling Conflicting Standards in Adjudicating
Juvenile Curfew Challenges, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 518, 523-525 (2000); Brian
Privor, Article, Dusk ‘Til Dawn: Children’s Rights and the Effectiveness of Juvenile
Curfew Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. REV. 415, 418-21 (1999).
26
See Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 25, at 280 (noting that approximately 3,000
municipalities had enacted a juvenile curfew ordinance by the turn of the twentieth
century); Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors’ Fundamental Rights: Juvenile
Curfews and the Constitution, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1164 n.9 (1984). See also
Privor, supra note 25, at 418 (“American cities have implemented juvenile curfews[]
. . . for at least 100 years.”).
27
See Chudy, supra note 25, at 524-25; Gregory Z. Chen, Note, Youth Curfews and
the Trilogy of Parent, Child, and State Relations, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 134
(1997); Brian J. Lester, Comment, Is It Too Late for Juvenile Curfews: QUTB Logic
and the Constitution, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 665, 668 (1996) (citation omitted).
28
See Major Confusion, supra note 25, at 2403 (citation omitted); Chudy, supra note
25, at 525.
29
See Major Confusion, supra note 25, at 2403 (stating that seventy-three percent of
cities with 100,000 residents had enacted a juvenile curfew by 1995) (citation
omitted); Privor, supra note 25, at 419 (stating that approximately eighty percent of
cities with 100,000 residents have passed curfews between 1949 and 1999) (citation
omitted). See also Leslie Joan Harris, An Empirical Study of Parental Responsibility
Laws: Sending Messages, but What Kind and To Whom?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 5, 19
n.69 (stating that more than seventy-five percent of the 200 largest U.S. cities had a
juvenile curfew ordinance in effect by 1995) (citations omitted).
30
Chudy, supra note 25, at 519 & n.2, 525. See also Major Confusion, supra note
25, at 2403 (“In the 1990s, . . . juvenile victimization and crime rates seemed to
explode across the country.”); Privor, supra note 25, at 420-21 (stating that juvenile
arrests for violent crimes increased by seventy percent between 1989 and 1993);
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curfews are most prevalent in urban areas,31 municipalities have enacted
curfews “in a variety of contexts and circumstances,”32 including attempts to
control loitering and vagrancy,33 subdue civil disorder and race riots,34 regulate
access to public parks,35 and “keep African Americans off the streets during
certain hours of the night.”36 The Supreme Court has even upheld a general
curfew and other restrictions as a constitutional means to protect national
security.37
In Hirabayashi v. United States,38 for example, the Court upheld a curfew
which confined Japanese-Americans who resided in designated military areas
to their homes between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m.39 as a valid “defense measure[] for
the avowed purpose of safeguarding the military area . . . at a time of threatened

Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 25, at 268 (“There is widespread sentiment in
America that juvenile crime is out of control.”).
31
Privor, supra note 25, at 416.
32
Chudy, supra note 25, at 523.
33
See generally, e.g., Guidoni v. Wheeler, 230 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1916) (upholding a
Juneau, Alaska, ordinance which defined and prohibited vagrants from “wandering
about the streets of the city” after 11 p.m.); Ruff v. Marshall, 438 F. Supp. 303 (M.D.
Ga. 1977) (enjoining the city of Eatonton, Georgia, from enforcing two ordinances
which prohibited loitering in public places). See also Chudy, supra note 25, at 52324.
34
See generally, e.g., United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971)
(upholding against First Amendment, vagueness, and overbreadth challenges a
temporary nighttime curfew in force during a declared state of emergency in
Asheville, North Carolina, that resulted from a “clash” between police and AfricanAmerican high school students); Glover v. District of Columbia, 250 A.2d 556 (D.C.
1969) (upholding against First Amendment, due process, and vagueness challenges a
nighttime curfew in force in Washington, D.C., in the wake of Dr. Martin Luther
King Jr.’s assassination); Ervin v. State, 41 Wis. 2d 194, 199 n.3, 201, 163 N.W. 2d
207, 210 n.3, 211 (1968) (stating that an emergency curfew in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, was “an emergency measure undertaken to restore order in the
community.”). See also Chudy, supra note 25, at 524.
The Glover court stated that “the nation has witnessed in recent years numerous
civil disorders and disturbances in American cities which have increasingly had to
resort to curfews to deal with such disorders.” Glover, 250 A.2d at 560 (citations
omitted). Cf. discussion infra Part I.B.3.
35
See generally, e.g., Peters v. Breier, 322 F. Supp. 1171 (E.D. Wis. 1971)
(involving a Milwaukee, Wisconsin, ordinance which prohibited one’s presence in a
certain public park between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m.). See also Chudy, supra note 25, at
524.
36
See also Chudy, supra note 25, at 523 (citing Peter L. Scherr, The Juvenile Curfew
Ordinance: In Search of a New Standard of Review, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 163, 164-65 (1992)).
37
See cases cited infra notes 38-45. See also Chudy, supra note 25, at 524.
38
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (opinion of Stone, J.).
39
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83-84.
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air raids and invasion by the Japanese forces.”40 In Korematsu v. United
States,41 the Court upheld Congress’s authorization42 to remove more than
112,000 Japanese-Americans from designated military areas43 as an
“aggregation of hardships”44 incident to war.45
The Supreme Court decided both Hirabayashi and Korematsu under the
Equal Protection Clause.46 Curfews are, however, subject to constitutional
attack under a host of other grounds,47 including the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments, and the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.48 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has never decided
the constitutionality of a juvenile curfew ordinance.49 Moreover, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland has reviewed juvenile curfews only within the due
process framework,50 despite such a “wide array of legal challenges to juvenile
curfew laws[.]”51

40

Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 94-95, 102. Accord Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S.
115, 116-17 (1943) (opinion of Strone, J.) (following Hirabayashi in affirming a
Japanese-American’s conviction for violating a wartime curfew).
41
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (opinion of Black, J.).
42
Id. at 216.
43
Id. at 236, 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
44
Id. at 219.
45
Id.
46
Korematsu and Hirabayashi are the only two Supreme Court rulings to affirm the
constitutionality of a race-based classification. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 715 (4th ed. 2011). But cf.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (characterizing the internment
of more than 112,000 Japanese-Americans as “one of the most sweeping and
complete deprivations of constitutional rights in the history of this nation.”).
These decisions, however, have since been looked upon with disfavor. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra. See also Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 279, 932 A.2d
571, 607 (2007) (opinion of Harrell, J.) (“[T]he Supreme Court has characterized
repeatedly as suspect classes distinctions based on . . . national origin[.]”); Chew v.
State, 71 Md. App. 681, 712, 527 A.2d 332, 347-48 (1987) (“The Supreme Court has
deemed discrimination by states on the basis of ancestry to be violative of the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citations omitted).
47
See generally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Validity, construction, and effect of
juvenile curfew regulations, 83 A.L.R. 4th 1056 (1991).
48
See generally id.
49
See Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 25, at 273 n.40 (1998); Susan M. Horowitz,
A Search for Constitutional Standards: Judicial Review of Juvenile Curfew
Ordinances, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 381, 383 (1991).
50
See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
51
Privor, supra note 25, at 428.
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B. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CURFEW LAWS IN MARYLAND
1. Curfews in Other Maryland Counties and Municipalities52
Baltimore City is not the only county53 or municipality54 in Maryland that
can enforce a curfew.55 At least two other counties—Cecil County and Prince
George’s County—have a juvenile curfew ordinance currently in force.56 The
Howard County and Prince George’s County executives each are statutorily
authorized to establish an emergency curfew.57
52

The discussion of curfew laws in other Maryland counties and municipalities in
Part I.B.1. is not exhaustive. All local curfew laws referenced in this discussion are
accessible in one of two online databases, eCode360 or Municode. See ECODE360,
http://www.generalcode.com/codification/ecode/library (last visited Oct. 12, 2015);
MUNICODE, https://www.municode.com/library/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2015).
53
See MD. CODE ANN., LOCAL GOV’T § 1-101(e) (“ ‘County’ means a county of
[Maryland] or Baltimore City.”).
54
The term “municipality,” as used in Part I.B. refers to a city or town located in one
of Maryland’s twenty-four counties; it does not refer to a county or Baltimore City.
See supra note 53. Such references do not necessarily include the statutory
definition of “municipality.” Cf. MD. CODE ANN., LOCAL GOV’T § 1-101(g)
(“ ‘Municipality’ means a municipality that is organized under Article XI-E of the
Maryland Constitution.”).
55
See infra notes 56-57, 61-65. See also Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 25, at 273
(“The vast majority of juvenile curfews are local municipal legislation.”).
56
CECIL CNTY., MD., CODE pt. II, ch. 180 (General Code Online through Nov. 4,
2014), available at http://www.ecode360.com/15792287; PRINCE GEORGE’S CNTY.,
MD., CODE subtit. 14, div. 1 (Municode Library through Aug. 26, 2015), available at
https://www.municode.com/library/MD/prince_george's_county/codes/code_of_ordi
nances?nodeId=PTIITI17PULOLAPRGECOMA_SUBTITLE_14MOCO_DIV1JUC
U.
Neither Cecil County nor Prince George’s County has explicit power to enact a
juvenile curfew. Instead, such authority might be inherent or implied in other
powers granted under those counties’ charters. See, e.g., CECIL CNTY., MD.,
CHARTER § 301 (General Code Outline through Nov. 4, 2014) (“[T]he Council may
enact public local laws for the peace, good government, health, safety or welfare of
the County.”), available at http://www.ecode360.com/15790738. Cf. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power * * * To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof.”).
57
See HOWARD CNTY., MD., CODE §§ 6.103, 6.104 (Municode Library though July
16, 2015), available at https://www.municode.com/library/MD/howard_county/
codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=HOCOCO_TIT6COEXEXBR_SUBTITLE_1TH
COEX; PRINCE GEORGE’S CNTY., MD., CODE §§ 6-102, 6-135 (Municode Library
through Aug. 26, 2015), available at https://www.municode.com/library/MD/
prince_george's_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIITI17PULOLAPRG
ECOMA_SUBTITLE_6EMMA_DIV1GEPR.
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Similarly, at least forty-five municipalities in Maryland either are explicitly
authorized to enact a juvenile curfew,58 have one currently in force,59 or have
the power to establish and enforce an emergency curfew.60 Twenty-three
municipalities do not have a juvenile curfew currently in force, but are
authorized under their charters to enact one.61
In contrast, twenty
62
municipalities have a juvenile curfew currently in force,63 nine of which are
not explicitly authorized by that municipality’s charter.64
Twelve
For a discussion of an emergency curfew in Baltimore City that was enforced
between April 28 and May 4, 2015, see discussion infra Part I.B.3.
58
See infra note 61.
59
See infra notes 62-64.
60
See infra note 65.
61
Berlin, Brentwood, Cambridge, Chesapeake Beach, Delmar, Denton, Fruitland,
Glenarden, Hagerstown, Hampstead, Indian Head, La Plata, Leonardtown,
Lonaconing, Mardela Springs, Ocean City, Pittsville, Princess Anne, Rockville, St.
Michaels, Sharptown, Snow Hill, and Willards. See, e.g., BERLIN, MD., CHARTER §
C5-1(B)(14) (Municode through Nov. 18, 2014), available at
https://www.municode.com/library/md/berlin/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PT
ITHCH_ARTVGEPO_SC5-1ENPO; BRENTWOOD, MD., CHARTER § 402.11
(General Code Outline through June 6, 2013), available at http://www.ecode360.
com/27505182; CAMBRIDGE, MD., CHARTER § 3-27(16) (Municode through Feb. 27,
2012), available at https://www.municode.com/library/md/cambridge/codes/
code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTITHCH_S3-27POLI; CHESAPEAKE BEACH, MD.,
CHARTER § C-501(16) (General Code Outline through Nov. 20, 2014), available at
http://www.ecode360.com/15138318; WICOMICO CNTY., MD., DELMAR CHARTER §
DC4-12(C)(14) (General Code Outline), available at
http://www.ecode360.com/13348784.
62
Aberdeen, Emmitsburg, Federalsburg, Forest Heights, Frederick, Galena, Havre de
Grace, Laurel, Manchester, Middletown, Mt. Airy, Myersville, New Windsor, North
Beach, Ridgely, Rock Hall, Smithsburg, Sykesville, Westminster, and Woodsboro.
See infra notes 63-64.
63
See, e.g., FOREST HEIGHTS, MD., CODE § 13.7 (General Code Outline through Jan.
21, 2015), available at http://www.ecode360.com/26873408; GALENA, MD., CODE
ch. 112 (General Code Outline through July 7, 2014), available at http://www.ecode
360.com/16069635; HAVRE DE GRACE, MD., CODE ch. 52 (General Code Outline
through June 1, 2015), available at http://www.ecode360.com/8367988; LAUREL,
MD., CODE ch. 9, art. V (Municode through Dec. 15, 2015), available at
https://www.municode.com/library/md/laurel/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=C
H9MIPROF_ARTVCUPARE; MT. AIRY, MD., CODE ch. 51 (General Code Outline
through June 1, 2015), available at http://www.ecode360.com/6264839.
64
See, e.g., ABERDEEN, MD., CODE ch. 272 (General Code Outline through May 18,
2015), available at http://www.ecode360.com/14364539; EMMITSBURG, MD., MUN.
CODE § 9.12.040 (Municode through July 17, 2015), available at https://www.
municode.com/library/md/emmitsburg/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=TIT9PUP
EMOWE_CH9.12OFAGMI_9.12.040JUCU; FEDERALSBURG, MD., CODE ch. 48
(General Code Outline through Jan. 6, 2014), available at http://www.ecode
360.com/9899580; FREDERICK, MD., CODE ch. 15 (Municode through June 30,
2015), available at https://www.municode.com/library/md/frederick/codes/
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municipalities have the power to establish and enforce an emergency curfew.65
In total, at least three of Maryland’s twenty-four counties, including
Baltimore City,66 have a county-wide juvenile curfew currently in force.67
Among forty-three municipalities which are explicitly or implicitly authorized
to enact a juvenile curfew,68 twenty-three do not have one currently in force.69
These patterns suggest that juvenile curfews are relatively uncommon in
Maryland.70
Constitutional challenges to juvenile curfews in Maryland are even more
infrequent. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has never decided a
constitutional challenge to a county-wide curfew; it has decided a
constitutional challenge to a municipal curfew only twice.71
2. Maryland’s Highest Court Upholds One Local Curfew and
Invalidates Another
Only two cases which lodged a constitutional attack against a juvenile
curfew ordinance have reached the Court of Appeals of Maryland:
Thistlewood v. Trial Magistrate for Ocean City72 and Ashton v. Brown.73 The
code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIITHCO_CH15OFIS; MANCHESTER, MD., CODE ch.
77 (General Code Outline through Jan. 13, 2015), available at
http://www.ecode360.com/11818001.
65
Annapolis, Berlin, Forest Heights, Hagerstown, La Plata, Laurel, Ocean City,
Ridgely, Salisbury, Smithsburg, Snow Hill, and Westminster. See, e.g., ANNAPOLIS,
MD., CODE § 11.48.040(B)(3) (Municode through Aug. 3, 2015), available at
https://www.municode.com/library/md/annapolis/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId
=TIT11PUPEMOWE_CH11.48EMMA_11.48.040DESTEMFF; BERLIN, MD., CODE
§ 10-21 (Municode through Nov. 18, 2014), available at https://www.municode.
com/library/md/berlin/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=SPAADLE_CH10CIEM_
ARTIIEMMA_S10-21CU; FOREST HEIGHTS, MD., CODE § 2.9(A)(1) (General Code
Outline through Jan. 21, 2015), available at http://www.ecode360.com/29005190;
HAGERSTOWN, MD., CODE § 76-3 (General Code Outline through Sept. 30, 2014),
available at http://www.ecode360.com/9906165; LA PLATA, MD., CODE § 146-3
(Jan. 31, 2015), available at https://www.municode.com/library/md/la_plata/
codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CH146PEGOOR_146-3CU.
66
See supra note 53.
67
See supra note 56.
68
See supra notes 61-64.
69
See supra note 61.
70
See CUMBERLAND, MD., CODE § 11-131 (1966 & Supp. 1977), repealed by
Cumberland, Md., Ordinance 3205 (Oct. 17, 1995) (Municode through Aug. 28,
2015), available at https://www.municode.com/library/md/cumberland/codes/
code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICUCO_CH11MIPROF_ARTVOFINPUMO_S11131RE.
71
See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
72
236 Md. 548, 204 A.2d 688 (1964) (opinion of Hammond, J.).
73
339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995) (opinion of Eldridge, J.).
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curfew at issue in Thistlewood “prohibited persons under twenty-one [years
old] from remaining on the streets of [Ocean City] between 12:01 a.m. and
6:00 a.m.” during Labor Day Weekend in 1963.74 A trial magistrate convicted
two defendants who violated the curfew.75
The defendants sought an annulment of their convictions on grounds that
the curfew unconstitutionally restricted their “personal liberties.”76 Four
judges upheld the curfew.77 The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals
of Maryland, arguing that the curfew violated their substantive due process
rights.78
The court of appeals interpreted the curfew’s meaning before it turned to
the due process question. The court concluded that Ocean City’s curfew was
promulgated “against those who . . . loiter or congregate” in public areas “as a
short term emergency measure to protect both its citizens and visitors from
groups of minors and the minors from themselves.”79 The court held,
therefore, that the curfew prohibited minors from “remaining” on city streets
and in other public areas, but that it permitted their mere presence there.80
Turning to the due process question, the court concluded that there was “a
real and substantial relation”81 between the curfew and “the objects sought to
be attained.”82 The court held, therefore, that the curfew did not infringe upon
the petitioners’ fundamental rights.83 Accordingly, the court upheld the
curfew’s constitutional validity,84 and affirmed the petitioners’ convictions.85
Like Thistlewood, the curfew at issue in Ashton implicated the Due Process
Clause,86 but the court of appeals struck down it down as unconstitutionally
vague.87 At issue in Ashton was the City of Frederick’s curfew,88 which
prohibited a minor less than eighteen years old from “remain[ing] in or upon
any public place or any establishment”89 from 11 p.m. until 6 a.m. during the
week, and from 11:59 p.m. until 6 a.m. on the weekend.90
74

Thistlewood, 236 Md. at 549, 204 A.2d at 689.
Id.
76
Id. at 550, 204 A.2d at 689.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 556, 204 A.2d at 693.
80
Thistlewood, 236 Md. at 555, 204 A.2d at 692.
81
Id. at 556, 204 A.2d at 693.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 557, 204 A.2d at 693.
84
Id. at 557, 204 A.2d at 694.
85
Id.
86
See generally Ashton, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447.
87
Id. at 93, 660 A.2d at 458.
88
Id. at 79, 660 A.2d at 451.
89
Id. at 80 & n.1, 660 A.2d at 452 & n.1 (citing FREDERICK, MD., CODE § 15-10
(1966 & Supp. 1992)).
90
Id. at 80 & n.1, 660 A.2d at 452 & n.1 (citing FREDERICK, MD., CODE §§ 15-9(a),
15-10 (1966 & Supp. 1992)).
75
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Police detained the plaintiffs and twenty-six other suspected curfew
violators outside a privately-owned business, of which the clientele was
predominately African-American.91 At least twenty-five of the twenty-eight
people detained were African-American.92
The plaintiffs alleged that enforcement of Frederick’s curfew was racially
motivated.93 They sought a declaratory judgment that the curfew was
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague, and infringed upon their First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, among others.94 The plaintiffs further sought
an injunction against the curfew’s enforcement.95
The Circuit Court for Frederick County concluded that the curfew was
constitutional, and therefore, enforceable.96 The court, however, did not rule
on the plaintiffs’ allegations that the curfew’s enforcement was racially
discriminatory.97
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,98
which concluded that Frederick’s curfew was unconstitutional99 because it
“burden[ed] the fundamental rights of minors and [was] not justified by any
compelling governmental interest.”100 Reasoning in the alternative, the court
of special appeals also held that the curfew was unconstitutionally vague.101
Accordingly, it reversed the trial court’s judgment.102 Like the trial court,
though, the court of special appeals did not rule on the appellants’ contention
that enforcement of the curfew was racially discriminatory.103
The City of Frederick appealed to the court of appeals,104 which decided
the issue on vagueness grounds.105 The court concluded that neither the public
nor police could determine from the curfew’s prohibitions and exceptions
whether a minor’s “nighttime excursion” was violative of, or protected by, the
91

Id. at 82, 660 A.2d at 453.
Ashton, 339 Md. at 82 & n.4, 660 A.2d at 453 & n.4 (“According to affidavits
filed by the plaintiffs, twenty-eight suspected curfew violators were detained in the
crackdown . . ., all of whom were African-American. * * * According to the
defendants, twenty-five of the twenty-eight arrestees were African-American.”).
93
Id. at 82, 660 A.2d at 453-54.
94
Id. at 84, 660 A.2d at 454.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 85, 660 A.2d at 454.
97
Id.
98
Ashton, 339 Md. at 85, 660 A.2d at 454.
99
Id. at 85, 660 A.2d at 455.
100
Id. (quoting Brown v. Ashton, 93 Md. App. 25, 46, 611 A.2d 599, 609 (1992)).
101
Id. at 85-86, 660 A.2d at 455 (citing Brown, 93 Md. App. at 49, 611 A.2d at 611).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 86, 660 A.2d at 455.
104
Ashton, 339 Md. at 86, 660 A.2d at 455. Both parties petitioned the court of
appeals for a writ of certiorari. Id. Only the City of Frederick’s appeal, which
challenged the Court of Special Appeals’s judgment that the curfew was
unconstitutional, id., is relevant to this discussion.
105
Id. at 88 n.8, 660 A.2d at 456 n.8.
92
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curfew.106 The court held, therefore, that the curfew was unconstitutionally
vague, and thus violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.107 The
court of appeals, like the courts below, did not address whether the curfew’s
enforcement was racially discriminatory.108
Ashton suggests that Maryland courts are hesitant to review a juvenile
curfew ordinance on grounds of race discrimination, perhaps because courts
in different jurisdictions do not analyze the issue under a uniform standard.109
However, Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew110 is vulnerable to such an
attack,111 and an attack on grounds of age discrimination.112 In contrast, a
challenge to the city’s power to enforce an emergency curfew has proved
futile.113
3. An Emergency Curfew in Baltimore City Is Challenged
Freddie Gray’s death on April 19, 2015,114 ignited a wave of protests, and,
according to various media characterizations, “riots,” “civil unrest,” “civil
disorder”, and “the Baltimore uprising.”115 On April 27, the Governor of
Maryland, Larry Hogan, declared a state of emergency116 in response to the
public outcry following Gray’s death.117 A few hours later, the Mayor of
106

Id. at 89, 660 A.2d at 456-57.
Id. at 93, 660 A.2d at 456. Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is
Maryland’s analog to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Compare MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 24 (“That no man ought to be
taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed,
or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property,
but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.”), with U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law[.]”).
108
Ashton, 339 Md. at 88 n.8, 660 A.2d at 456 n.8.
109
See Chudy, supra note 25, at 522.
110
See discussion infra Part I.C.
111
See discussion infra Part II.C.
112
See discussion infra Part II.B.
113
See discussion infra Part I.B.3.
114
On April 12, 2015, police officers arrested Freddie Gray, who suffered fatal
injuries while he was in police custody. Gray fell into a coma, and died a week later,
on April 19. For detailed accounts of Freddie Gray’s death, its aftermath, and the
criminal prosecution of the six police officers who allegedly were involved, see
Freddie Gray & Baltimore Unrest, BALTIMORESUN.COM,
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/ (last visited Oct. 2,
2015).
115
Id.
116
See Exec. Order No. 01.01.2015.16, 42 Md. Reg. 644 (May 1, 2015).
117
The executive order cited Baltimore City’s need to:
107
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Baltimore City, Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, announced that an emergency
curfew would take effect the following day, and would remain in force until
May 4.118
The emergency curfew applied equally to juveniles and adults between 10
p.m. and 5 a.m. on the following day.119 The Circuit Court for Baltimore City
upheld a challenge to Rawlings-Blake’s power to impose and enforce the
emergency curfew.120
The challenge arose when a man was charged with violating the emergency
curfew.121 The Circuit Court for Baltimore City concluded that RawlingsBlake’s imposition and enforcement of the emergency curfew was within her
mayoral powers as a “conservator of the peace.”122
Similarly, Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew is within the City Council’s
legislative powers, as granted by the city’s charter123 and the Maryland General
Assembly.124 Whether the City Council’s exercise of that power comports
with the Equal Protection Clause is explored in Parts II and III.
take protective actions to protect the lives and property of citizens
being currently impacted . . .;
***
to activate certain emergency contracts, and to facilitate the
deployment of requisite resources . . .;
***
Use . . . resources of the Maryland National Guard[.]
Id. at 644.
118
Balt., Md., Curfew – Emergency (Apr. 27, 2015), available at
http://www.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/Curfew-Emergency-20150427.pdf.
119
Id. at 1-2.
120
See Justin Fenton, Judge upholds mayor’s curfew authority while dismissing
charge, BALTIMORE SUN (July 7, 2015 10:03 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-ci-curfew-upheld20150707-story.html. The circuit court did not issue a written order. Instead, it
announced its ruling on the record in open court.
121
Id.
122
Id. See also BALT. CITY, MD., CHARTER art IV, § 4(a), at 110, (Balt. City Dep’t
of Legislative Reference 2015) (“The Mayor, by virtue of the office, shall have all
the powers of a conservator of the peace.”), available at http://archive.baltimore
city.gov/Portals/0/Charter%20and%20Codes/ChrtrPLL/01%20-%20Charter.pdf.
123
See BALT., MD., CHARTER art. II, § 47; art. III, § 11 (Balt. City Dep’t of
Legislative Reference 2015), available at http://archive.baltimorecity.gov/
Portals/0/Charter%20and%20Codes/ChrtrPLL/01%20-%20Charter.pdf.
124
See MD. CODE ANN., LOCAL GOV’T § 10-206(a)(2) (“A county council may pass
any ordinance, resolution, or bylaw not inconsistent with State law that: . . . may aid
in maintaining the peace, good government, health, and welfare of the county.”).
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C. BALTIMORE CITY’S JUVENILE CURFEW125
1. Defining the Curfew and Its General Prohibitions126
Baltimore City’s new curfew applies to minors127 in public places,128 and
their parents.129 Both the daytime and nighttime curfews prohibit a minor from
“remain[ing]130 in or about any public place or establishment”131 during
specified hours, depending on the minor’s age, the day of the week, and the
time of the year.132 The curfew further prohibits a minor’s parent from
knowingly permitting, or by insufficient control allowing, the minor to violate
either curfew.133
2. The Curfew’s Time and Place Restrictions
a. The Daytime Curfew134
The daytime curfew requires minors less than sixteen years old to be in
school between 7:30 a.m. and 3 p.m. on any school day.135 The daytime
curfew’s exceptions protect a minor who is absent from school if:

125

See generally BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, subtit. 34.
For the curfew’s relevant definitions, see id. § 34-1. See also infra notes 127-31.
127
“Minor” means any person less than seventeen years old. BALT., MD., CODE UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-1(d). This Comment hereinafter uses the terms
“minor,” “juvenile,” and “child” or “children” interchangeably.
128
“Public place” means any public street, highway, road, alley, park, playground,
wharf, dock, public building, or vacant lot. Id. § 34-1(g) (quotation marks omitted).
129
“Parent” means a minor’s biological parent, legal guardian, or any person at least
eighteen years old who is legally responsible for the care and custody of a minor. Id.
§ 34-1(f).
130
“Remain” means to loiter, idle, wander, stroll, or play in or upon. Id. § 34-1(h)
(quotation marks omitted).
131
“Establishment” means any privately-owned, for-profit place of business, or any
public place of amusement or entertainment. Id. § 34-1(b).
132
See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
133
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-5. The curfew also
prohibits the “operator” of an establishment, and his agents and employees, from
knowingly permitting a minor in violation of the daytime or nighttime curfews to
remain on the premises. Id. §§ 34-1(e)(1), 34-6. However, the curfew’s
constitutional implications upon establishments and their owners, if any, are beyond
this Comment’s scope.
134
See generally id. § 34-4.
135
Id. § 34-4(a).
126
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•   the minor has written proof from school authorities
excusing attendance at a particular time;136
•   the minor is accompanied by a parent or person at least
twenty-one years of age;137 or
•   the minor is traveling to or from school.138
The nighttime curfew, however, is more nuanced than its daytime
counterpart.139
b. The Nighttime Curfew140
The nighttime curfew differs for minors who are less than fourteen years
old and those who are between fourteen and seventeen years old.141 The
nighttime curfew categorically requires minors less than fourteen years old to
be at home between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. of the following day—regardless of the
day of the week or time of the year.142
In contrast, the curfew permits minors between fourteen and seventeen
years old to stay out until 10 p.m. on weeknights, and until 11 p.m. on the
weekends, during the academic year.143 During the summer months, minors
between fourteen and seventeen years old may be out until 11 p.m. every night
of the week.144
For minors between fourteen and seventeen years old, the curfew’s two
different time components145 seem to be at odds with each other. The curfew’s
plain language does not clearly indicate whether minors between fourteen and
seventeen years old are permitted to stay out until 11 p.m. on a weeknight
during the academic year when school is closed the following day.146
136

Id. § 34-4(b)(1).
Id. § 34-4(b)(2).
138
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-4(b)(3) (quotation marks
omitted).
139
See discussion infra Part I.C.2.b.
140
See generally BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-3.
141
Compare id. § 34-3(b), with id. § 34-3(c)(1) to (c)(2). However, the nighttime
curfew terminates at 6 a.m. each day, regardless of the minor’s age. See id. §§ 343(b), 34-3(c)(1) to (c)(2)(iii).
142
See id. § 34-3(b).
143
See id. § 34-3(c)(2)(i) to (c)(2)(iii).
144
See BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-3(c)(1).
145
See id. § 34-3(c)(1) to (c)(2)(iii).
146
Compare id. § 34-3(c)(1) (“From and including 12:01 a.m. on the Friday
preceding Memorial Day each year through 12 midnight of the last Sunday of August
each year, no minor at least 14, but less than 17, years of age may remain in or about
any public place or any establishment between the hours of 11 p.m. on any day and 6
a.m. of the following day.”) (emphasis added), with id. § 34-3(c)(2)(iii) (“For the
remainder of the calendar year, no minor at least 14, but less than 17, years of age
137
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Nonetheless, the nighttime curfew provides for seven exceptions.147 It
protects minors who are:
•   accompanied by a parent;148
•   exercising their First Amendment rights under the U.S.
Constitution;149
•   traveling in a motor vehicle;150
•   traveling to, engaged in, or returning from their place of
employment;151
•   involved in an emergency;152
•   present on the sidewalk abutting their residence;153 or
•   traveling to, attending, or returning from an official
school, religious, or recreational activity.154
Moreover, the nighttime curfew’s exceptions apply equally to both age
classifications.155

may remain in or about any public place or any establishment . . . between the hours
of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. of the following day, on any other day of the week.”)
(emphasis added).
147
See infra notes 148-54.
148
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-3(a)(1).
149
Id. § 34-3(a)(2). This provision does not delineate the permissible scope within
which a minor may exercise his or her First Amendment rights. For example, this
provision seems to permit a minor’s participation in a protest during the late evening
and early morning hours, subject to other constitutionally valid time, place, and
manner restrictions, even though the curfew generally prohibits the minor’s presence
in public during those times.
150
Id. § 34-3(a)(3).
151
Id. § 34-3(a)(4).
152
Id. § 34-3(a)(5) (quotation marks omitted).
153
Id. § 34-3(a)(6).
154
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-3(a)(7).
155
See generally id. § 34-3(a).
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3. Enforcing the Curfew156
a. Enforcing the Curfew Against Minors157

Police do not specifically target curfew violators.158 Instead, detentions for
curfew violations occur during routine patrol.159
Police may detain a minor believed to be in violation of the curfew,160 but
the detention is not an arrest, nor does it create a criminal record for the
minor.161 Police must take a minor believed to be in violation of the curfew to
the minor’s school,162 a “Youth Connection Center,”163 or the minor’s home.164
The Youth Connection Center165 must notify a parent of the violation and
take appropriate measures to reduce the probability that the minor will commit
156

See generally id. §§ 34-8, 34-8.1, 34-9.
See generally id. § 34-8.
158
Telephone Interview with Angela Johnese, Dir., Mayor’s Office on Criminal
Justice, City of Balt., and Sulakshana Bhattacharya, Program Coordinator, Mayor’s
Office on Criminal Justice, City of Balt. (Feb. 25, 2015).
159
Id.
160
A police officer who has reason to believe that a minor is violating either the
daytime or nighttime curfew must “seek to obtain” the minor’s name, age, address,
school or other valid identification, and the name of his parent(s). BALT., MD., CODE
- UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-8(a)(1) to (a)(2).
161
Id. § 34-7. This provision does not preclude a police officer from arresting a
minor who is engaged in criminal activity while in violation of the curfew.
Telephone Interview with Angela Johnese and Sulakshana Bhattacharya, supra note
158. In such cases, police will not enforce the curfew against the minor, but they
will charge the minor with a crime. Id.
162
This provision applies only to the daytime curfew. See BALT., MD., CODE UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-8(b)(1)(i).
163
Id. §§ 34-8(b)(1)(ii), 34-8(c)(1)(ii).
The curfew does not explicitly define “Youth Connection Center.” See generally
id. § 34-1. Nevertheless, police may transport a minor believed to be in violation of
the daytime curfew to a “truancy center.” See id. § 34-1(i). Similarly, police may
transport a minor believed to be in violation of the nighttime curfew to a “juvenile
holding facility.” See id. § 34-1(c).
Both terms mean a place to which minors believed to be in violation of the curfew
may be taken to determine an appropriate course of action. Id. §§ 34-1(c), 34-1(i).
164
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, §§ 34-8(b)(1)(iii), 348(c)(1)(i).
165
Baltimore City operates two Youth Connection Centers. Press Release, Office of
the Mayor of Balt. City, Mayor Rawlings-Blake Releases Curfew Violation Numbers
(Sept. 11, 2014) (on file with Office of the Mayor of Balt. City), available at
http://mayor.baltimorecity.gov/news/press-releases/2014-09-11-curfew-violationnumbers-released.
The Lillian Jones Recreation Center (1301 North Stricker Street) is located in the
Sandtown-Winchester neighborhood in West Baltimore; Collington Square
Community Recreation Center (1409 North Patterson Park Avenue) is located in the
157

2015]

In the Street Tonight

29

a subsequent violation.166 If the minor’s parent or another adult family
member167 does not claim the minor from a youth connection center by 6 a.m.
the following morning, the minor may be referred to or placed in the custody
of the Baltimore City Department of Social Services.168
b. Enforcing the Curfew Against Parents169
Police may issue a civil citation to a parent who violates the curfew for the
first time.170 In lieu of being issued a civil citation for the first offense, a parent
may agree to attend family counseling sessions with the minor at a cityapproved agency.171 A parent who subsequently violates the curfew is guilty
of a misdemeanor172 and is subject to a maximum fine of $500 and/or
community service.173 Thus, the curfew’s enforcement strategy and sanctions
on parents imply legislative policies beyond those stated in the ordinance.174
D. THE BALTIMORE CITY COUNCIL’S INTERESTS UNDERLYING ITS
CURFEW
1.   Explicit Policies: Reducing Juvenile Crime and Delinquency, and
Promoting Education
a.   The Baltimore City Council’s Legislative Findings
Section 34-2 of Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew ordinance states three
legislative findings underlying the curfew.175 First, the “substantial increase”
in the volume and severity of crimes committed by minors is a “menace to the

Broadway East neighborhood in East Baltimore. Id.
166
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, §§ 34-8(b)(2)(i) to (b)(2)(ii),
34-8(c)(2).
167
See id. § 34-8(c)(2)(i) (“If the minor is taken to a Youth Connection Center, the
facility shall notify a parent or an adult brother, sister, aunt, uncle, or grandparent to
come and take charge of the minor.”).
168
Id. § 34-8(c)(3)(ii).
169
See generally id. § 34-9(a).
170
Id. § 34-9(a)(1)(i).
171
Id. § 34-9(a)(1)(ii). A parent’s attendance at a family counseling session is
entirely voluntary. Telephone Interview with Angela Johnese and Sulakshana
Bhattacharya, supra note 158. As such, there are no records of parents who opt for
the family counseling sessions. Id. Family Tree is one example of an organization
which provides family counseling services. Id. For additional information for
Family Tree, see FAMILYTREE, http://www.familytreemd.org/.
172
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-9(a)(2).
173
Id. § 34-9(a)(2)(i) to (a)(2)(ii).
174
See discussion infra Part I.D.2.
175
See generally BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-2.
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preservation of public peace, safety, health, morals, and welfare.”176 The
Mayor of Baltimore and the Baltimore City Council dubbed this finding an
“emergency.”177
176

Id. § 34-2(1).
Indeed, reducing the juvenile crime rate and protecting juveniles from becoming
victims of crime are among the most common policies underlying juvenile curfew
ordinances. See Brant K. Brown, Note, Scrutinizing Juvenile Curfews:
Constitutional Standards & the Fundamental Rights of Juveniles & Parents, 53
VAND. L. REV. 653, 659 (2000). See also Privor, supra note 25, at 416 (“Many
municipal policymakers have embraced juvenile curfew laws to keep youths off the
streets and out of harm's way during the nighttime and early morning hours.”). But
see Memorandum from Shalik D. Fulton, Comm’r Chairman, Balt. City Youth
Comm’n, and Cody L. Dorsey, Comm. Chairman, Balt. City Youth Comm’n, to
Bernard C. “Jack” Young, President, Balt. City Council (Oct. 10, 2013) (on file with
author) (“We have spoken to our peers, and some believe this legislation will not
deter youth from committing crime.”).
177
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-2(1).
The volume and severity of crime in Baltimore City is not exclusive to minors.
See, e.g., Justin Fenton & Luke Broadwater, Stray bullets again strike bystanders in
city, BALTIMORE SUN (Oct. 5, 2015, 8:15 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/
news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-bystander-shootings-20151005-story.html
(reporting an eighty percent rise in gun violence in Baltimore City between 2014 and
2015, and that the number of homicides in the city is on pace to reach 300 for the
first time since the 1990s); Justin Fenton, Christina Jedra, & Mayah Collins, 45
murders in 31 days: Looking back at Baltimore's deadliest month, BALTIMORE SUN
(Aug. 29, 2015, 12:08 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/investigations/bs-md-ci-julyhomicide-victims-20150829-story.html (reporting the highest monthly homicide
total in Baltimore City, forty-five, since August 1972, when the city had
approximately 275,000 more residents).
Still, the Mayor and City Council’s findings as to the volume and severity of
juvenile crime and victimization are not unfounded. See, e.g., Mark Puente, Girl, 9,
shot Sunday afternoon in Waverly, BALTIMORE SUN (Oct. 4, 2015, 9:02 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/blog/bs-md-ci-shooting20151004-story.html (reporting the death of a nine-year-old who was struck by a
stray bullet while playing outside on a weekend afternoon); Kevin Rector, Two teens
with toy gun arrested in Bolton Hill carjacking, BALTIMORE SUN (Sept. 22, 2015,
6:00 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/blog/bs-md-toy-guncarjacking-20150922-story.html (reporting that two teenagers, ages sixteen and
eighteen, respectively, were arrested and charged with armed robbery and assault
after they allegedly used a toy gun in a carjacking at 7 a.m.). But see Luke
Broadwater, Key lawmaker questions need for new youth jail in city, BALTIMORE
SUN (Sept. 1, 2015, 7:38 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-juvenile-jail20150901-story.html (reporting a ten-year low, and a fifty-seven percent drop since
2012, in the daily average number of juveniles who are detained at the Baltimore
City Juvenile Justice Center).

2015]

In the Street Tonight

31

Second, the city’s increase in juvenile delinquency “has been caused in part
by the large number of minors who are permitted to remain in public places
and in certain establishments during night hours without adult supervision, and
during daylight hours at times when, by law, they are required to attend
school.”178 Third, the “alarming” increase in truancy,179 coupled with the
“rapid” decrease in academic achievement,180 has resulted in an “increase in
failures and dropouts, frustration, malcontent, antisocial conduct, and, for
many, a future without promise.”181
b. The Baltimore City Council’s Legislative Intent
The curfew purports to reduce juvenile delinquency by “regulating the
hours during which minors may remain in public places and in certain
establishments without adult supervision, and by imposing certain duties and
responsibilities upon the parents or other adult persons who have care and
custody of minors.”182 The curfew further purports to ensure a basic education
of the city’s youth:
Education is the foundation of success and a productive life.
The City of Baltimore provides the educational system and its
staff, but the cooperation of students and their parents
determines the productivity of the educational system. Late
evening activity by certain of our youth prevents them from
concentrating in class or, even worse, causes their absence
from class. This, together with truancy, has risen alarmingly
in recent years and youth is thus deprived of a necessary basic
education.183
The curfew’s stated policies notwithstanding, the Baltimore City Council’s
unstated intent is implicit in the curfew’s legislative history.184
2. Implicit Policies: Encouraging Parents to Take a More Active Role in
Raising Their Children
The Baltimore City Council’s interest behind the curfew extends beyond
reducing juvenile crime, delinquency, and promoting education. For example,
The curfew, however, would not have prevented the death of a nine-year-old girl
or the alleged carjacking. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
178
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-2(2).
179
Id. § 34-2(3).
180
Id. § 34-2(2).
181
Id.
182
Id. § 34-2(4).
183
Id. § 34-2(3).
184
See discussion infra Part I.D.2.
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the legislative history suggests the curfew will force parents to be more
involved in raising their children, connect at-risk families with the social
services they need, or both.185 The curfew’s sanctions on parents186 imply the
curfew’s purpose is to compel parents to take a more active role in raising their
children.187 Indeed, the Baltimore City Police Department and the Office of
the State’s Attorney have recognized that curfew violation likely results from
unstable home environments.188
A parent’s curfew violation, however, may not constitute parental abuse or
neglect.189 Nevertheless, the Baltimore City Department of Social Services
suggested providing “in-home services” to parents of children who are less
than thirteen years old and who violate the curfew.190
Thus, the curfew implicitly seeks to link “those persons who violate the
curfew and their families with appropriate services”191 not merely to
185

See sources cited infra notes 188-91.
See generally BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-9(a).
187
See Orly Jashinsky, Article, Liberty for All? Juvenile Curfews: Always an
Unconstitutional and Ineffective Solution, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 546, 548-50
(1997).
188
See Memorandum from Ganesha Martin, Chief of Staff, Office of the Police
Comm’r, Balt. City Police Dep’t, to the Balt. City Council (May 6, 2014) (on file
with author) (“Minors who are found to be in violation of the curfew often times lack
supervision created by unstable living environments. The access to counseling
services in lieu of a civil citation is an opportunity to link youth and their families to
the social services they need.”); Memorandum from Greg L. Bernstein, State’s Att’y
for Balt. City, Office of the State’s Att’y for Balt. City, to the Balt. City Council
(Oct. 12, 2013) (on file with author) (“[C]urfew violation is often a sign of lack of
supervision from the addiction of a parent, unstable living arrangements, or other
problems facing the family.”).
189
Memorandum from David Thompson, Interim Dir., Balt. City Dep’t of Social
Servs., to the Balt. City Council (May 6, 2014) (on file with author).
Others, however, are concerned with child safety and parental neglect. See
Despite concern, Baltimore City positive about new curfew law, ABC2NEWS.COM
(Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.abc2news.com/news/region/baltimore-city/despiteconcern-baltimore-city-positive-about-new-curfew-law (updated Aug. 12, 2014); Kai
Reed, Baltimore leaders answer child curfew questions at forum, WBALTV.COM
(July 22, 2014, 8:17 AM), http://www.wbaltv.com/news/baltimore-leaders-answerchild-curfew-questions-at-forum/27087298; Lowell Melser, New Baltimore curfew
law sparks controversy, WBALTV.COM (June 4, 2014, 7:40 AM),
http://www.wbaltv.com/news/new-baltimore-curfew-law-sparks-controversy/
26310430; Cody L. Dorsey, Curfew law will make Baltimore safer for youths
[Letter], BALTIMORE SUN (May 19, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-0519/news/bs-ed-curfew-20140519_1_baltimore-city-council-curfew-law-youths.
190
Memorandum from David Thompson, supra note 189.
191
Memorandum from Greg L. Bernstein, supra note 188. See also Interview with
Brandon Scott, Councilman, Balt. City Council, in Balt., Md. (Aug. 5, 2015) (notes
on file with author).
186

2015]

In the Street Tonight

33

encourage, but to compel parents to be more involved in raising their
children.192 The curfew is, therefore, vulnerable to a constitutional challenge
on grounds that it infringes on a parent’s fundamental right under the
Fourteenth Amendment to raise his or her children.193
Opponents of the curfew further acknowledge that many parents in the city are in
need of the social services to which the curfew is designed to connect them, but they
argue the curfew will be ineffective in doing so. See Gary Gately, Baltimore’s
Newly Approved Youth Curfew Among Strictest in Nation, JUVENILE JUSTICE
INFORMATION EXCHANGE (June 16, 2014), http://jjie.org/baltimores-newlyapproved-youth-curfew-among-strictest-in-nation/.
192
The American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland contends that:
[T]he proposal significantly infringes upon fundamental parental
rights by depriving parents of discretion to raise their children in
ways that make sense for the family. . . . There are an infinite number
of scenarios in which the proposed expansion deprives parents of
the ability to make perfectly healthy, appropriate and good decisions
for their kids.
Letter from Sonia Kumar, Staff Att’y, Am. Civil Liberties Union of Md., to Bernard
C. “Jack” Young, President, Balt. City Council, and City Council, Balt., Md. (May
12, 2014) (on file with author), available at http://www.aclumd.org/uploaded_files/0000/0548/curfew_letter_080614.pdf.
193
See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (opinion of Rutledge,
J.) (“[T]he custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents[.]”)
(citation omitted); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (opinion of
McReynolds, J.) (“The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400
(1923) (opinion of McReynolds, J.) (“[T]he right of parents to engage [a teacher] to
instruct their children . . . [is] within the liberty of the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”).
Accord In re Ashley S., 431 Md. 678, 683-84 & n.1, 66 A.3d 1022, 1025 & n.1
(2013); Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 Md. 661, 671, 948 A.2d 73, 79 (2008);
Koshko v. Haining, 398 Md. 404, 422-23, 921 A.2d 171, 181-82 (2007). An
analysis of this issue, however, is beyond this Comment’s scope.
For cases in which a court decided whether a juvenile curfew impermissibly
infringed on a parent’s right to raise his or her children, see, for example, Hutchins v.
District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Schleifer v. City of
Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1252 (1999);
McCollester v. Keene, 586 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.H. 1984); Bykofsky v. Middletown,
401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975); People v. Liccione, 964 N.Y.S. 2d 405 (J. Ct.
2013); Treacy v. Municipality of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252 (Alaska 2004); State v.
T.M., 761 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2000); City of Panora v.
Simmons, 445 N.W. 2d 363 (Iowa 1989); Milwaukee v. K.F., 145 Wis. 2d 24, 426
N.W. 2d 329 (1988); Allen v. Bordentown, 216 N.J. Super. 557, 524 A.3d 478
(1987); Eastlake v. Ruggiero, 7 Ohio App. 212, 220 N.E. 2d 126 (1966).
For a discussion of a juvenile curfew ordinance’s constitutional implications on
parental rights, see Harris, supra note 29; Brown, supra note 176; Chen, supra note
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Such an attack,194 however, is not the only one available. Indeed, the
curfew’s unstated policies and implicit intended effects195 raise additional
questions as to its enforcement patterns, which indicate that it discriminates on
the basis of age,196 race,197 or both.
II. ANALYZING BALTIMORE CITY’S JUVENILE CURFEW UNDER THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew implicates the Equal Protection Clause in
two ways. First, the curfew’s age classifications198 distinguish between those
subject to its restrictions and those free from them.199 Second, the curfew is
vulnerable to a challenge that the city enforces it disproportionately against
minorities.200
27.
194

The curfew’s lenient enforcement practices against parents diminish the threat
that it is an unconstitutional infringement on parental rights. See infra. For example,
police have discretion to issue a citation to parents who violate the curfew, but they
did not do so for any of the city’s first 398 reported violations. Telephone Interview
with Angela Johnese and Sulakshana Bhattacharya, supra note 158 (statistics
reported to be accurate through Feb. 21, 2015); E-mail from Sulakshana
Bhattacharya, Program Coordinator, Mayor’s Office on Criminal Justice, City of
Balt. to author (Feb. 26, 2015, 10:29 EST) (on file with author).
Moreover, attendance at a family counseling session at a city-approved agency is
voluntary, because a parent can elect this option instead of receiving a citation. See
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-9(a)(1); Telephone Interview
with Angela Johnese and Sulakshana Bhattacharya, supra. The city does not,
therefore, keep records of parents who elect to attend family counseling. Telephone
Interview with Angela Johnese and Sulakshana Bhattacharya, supra.
Similarly, the city does not track the number or identity of parents who are fined
for a subsequent curfew violation. See Interview with Brandon Scott, supra note
191. Thus, the absence of any citations to parents who permit their children to
violate the curfew, and of their participation in city-approved family counseling
programs, render the parental rights issue all but moot.
195
See sources cited supra notes 188-91.
196
See discussion infra Part II.B.
197
See discussion infra Part II.C. See also Hemmens & Bennett, supra note 25, at
275 (“[C]urfew opponents sometimes raise the specter of racist motivation for such
laws.”).
198
See BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, §§ 34-1(d), 34-3(b), 343(c) (Balt. City Dep’t of Legislative Reference 2015), available at
http://archive.baltimorecity.gov/portals/0/charter%20and%20Codes/code/Art%2019
%20-%20PoliceOrds.pdf. See also discussion supra Part I.C.
199
See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
200
See discussion infra Part II.C.3.
Critics of the curfew are especially leery of its potential for racial profiling,
fearing it will target predominantly, or entirely, African-American neighborhoods.
See Lauren Gambino, Outrage follows Baltimore’s ‘deeply flawed’ youth curfew
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However, federal and state courts often appear to avoid deciding a juvenile
curfew under the Equal Protection Clause201—perhaps because there is no
consensus among them as to the applicable standard of scrutiny,202 or because
deciding cases on other grounds203 is less burdensome.204 Instead, courts are

decision, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2014, 9:56 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/12/-sp-baltimore-city-council-youthcurfew (“Some of the strongest criticism of the law has come from those who believe
it’s shrouded in discrimination.”); Baltimore’s Tough Curfew Law Takes Effect,
CBSLOCAL.COM (Aug. 9, 2014, 9:53 AM), http://washington.cbslocal.com/
2014/08/08/baltimores-tough-curfew-law-takes-effect-today/ (“Critics say the
stringent bill could unfairly target African American children and teenagers.”); Justin
Worland, Baltimore Tightens Curfew Amid Skepticism and Protests, TIME (Aug. 8,
2014), http://time.com/3089931/baltimore-curfew/ (“Large cities, the types that
might benefit from a curfew, [do not] have the resources to actually patrol the entire
city. Instead, they focus on particular neighborhoods, often leading to racial
disparities in enforcement of the curfew, experts say.”).
201
See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas, 658 F.2d 1065, 1068, 1074 (5th Cir.
1981) (limiting the unconstitutionality of a juvenile curfew to its overbreadth while
declining to review the appellant’s First Amendment, due process, and equal
protection challenges); Naprstek v. City of Norwich, 545 F.2d 815, 817-18 (2d Cir.
1976) (voiding a juvenile curfew on vagueness grounds while declining to review
appellants’ First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment challenges); Ashton v.
Brown, 339 Md. 70, 93, 108, 600 A.2d 447, 458, 466 (1995) (voiding a juvenile
curfew on vagueness grounds while remanding for trial the appellees’ due process
and equal protection claims for civil damages under Article 24 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights). See also Note, Assessing the Scope of Minors’ Fundamental
Rights: Juvenile Curfews and the Constitution, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (1984)
[hereinafter Assessing the Scope] (“Courts have frequently sidestepped equal
protection objections to juvenile curfews by striking down challenged ordinances on
grounds of vagueness or overbreadth.”). But see, e.g., Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488
(5th Cir. 1993); Waters v. Barry, 711 F. Supp. 1125 (D. D.C. 1989); Bykofsky v.
Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Treacy v. Municipality
of Anchorage, 91 P.3d 252 (Alaska 2004); Allen v. City of Bordentown, 216 N.J.
Super. 557, 524 A.2d 478 (1987); People v. Walton, 70 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 862, 161
P.2d 498 (1945).
202
See Patryk J. Chudy, Note, Doctrinal Reconstruction: Reconciling Conflicting
Standards in Adjudicating Juvenile Curfew Challenges, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 518,
536 (2000) (“In adjudicating juvenile curfews, courts have applied three standards of
review: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational [basis] review.”); Brian
Privor, Article, Dusk ‘Til Dawn: Children’s Rights and the Effectiveness of Juvenile
Curfew Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. REV. 415, 660 (1999) (“[T]hree standards have
emerged for courts to use in determining the constitutionality of a statue [sic] under
equal protection analysis.”). See also discussion infra Part II.A.4.
203
See sources and cases cited infra notes 205-10.
204
See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
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more inclined to analyze a juvenile curfew under the First,205 Fourth,206 or
Fifth207 Amendments; the overbreadth208 or vagueness209 doctrines; or the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.210
Still, juvenile curfews are always vulnerable to an equal protection
attack,211 because they facially classify on the basis of age.212 Thus,
challenging a juvenile curfew’s age-based classification is the most direct
constitutional attack.213
Prior to the curfew’s enactment, several city officials questioned the
curfew’s constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause.214 The curfew’s
legislative history suggests that the required constitutional “nexus”215—the
degree to which the curfew’s classifications216 are linked to the Baltimore City
Council’s explicit217 and implicit218 interests—is tenuous.219 However,
whether the Equal Protection Clause requires the link to be rigid or merely
relaxed depends on the applicable standard of scrutiny.220 The Supreme Court

205

See, e.g., City of Maquoketa v. Russell, 484 N.W. 2d 179 (Iowa 1992). See also
Privor, supra note 202, at 426-28.
206
See, e.g., Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 963 F. Supp. 534 (W.D. Va. 1997),
aff’d, 159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998). See also Privor, supra note 202, at 426-28.
207
See, e.g., Waters, 711 F. Supp. 1125. See also Privor, supra note 202, at 426-28.
208
See Privor, supra note 202, at 426-28.
209
See id.
210
See id.
211
Brant K. Brown, Note, Scrutinizing Juvenile Curfews: Constitutional Standards
& the Fundamental Rights of Juveniles & Parents, 53 VAND. L. REV. 653, 654 n.5
(2000).
212
See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
213
See Privor, supra note 202, at 440.
214
See infra note 219.
215
Memorandum from Elena R. DiPietro, Chief Solicitor, Dep’t of Law, Office of
the Mayor of Balt., to the Balt. City Council (May 6, 2014) (on file with author).
216
See discussion supra Parts I.C.2.
217
See discussion supra Part I.D.1.
218
See discussion supra Part I.D.2.
219
Baltimore City’s chief solicitor, Elena R. DiPietro, cautioned, “Under current
Maryland law, it is possible that [the curfew] will be upheld. It is recommended that
there be proof offered that the law has a nexus to the governmental purposes sought
to be achieved.” Memorandum from Elena R. DiPietro, supra note 215 (emphasis
added).
DiPietro’s recommendation gives rise to two implications. First, the possibility
that a court will uphold the curfew necessarily suggests a possibility that a court will
invalidate it. Second, the recommendation that the City Council offer proof of a
legal nexus between the curfew and the “governmental purposes sought to be
achieved” suggests the City Council does not have proof of a legal nexus, or
alternatively, that it did not have proof of a legal nexus before enacting the curfew.
220
See discussion infra Parts II.A.1-3.
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has applied three different standards of review to equal protection challenges:
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.221
A. ARTICULATING THE STANDARDS OF SCRUTINY
1. Strict Scrutiny
Strict scrutiny is the most stringent standard of scrutiny under the equal
protection framework.222 Courts apply strict scrutiny to government action
which “operat[es] to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class,”223 including
those which discriminate on the basis of race.224 Government action subject
to strict scrutiny is presumptively invalid.225 However, a suspect classification
may nonetheless comport with the Equal Protection Clause if it is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest.226
2. Intermediate Scrutiny
Courts apply intermediate scrutiny to government action that discriminates
on the basis of gender227 or illegitimacy.228 Under intermediate scrutiny, the
state bears the burden of proving its action is constitutional.229 However,
government action subject to intermediate scrutiny may nonetheless comport
with the Equal Protection Clause if it is substantially related to furthering a
significant state interest.230
221

Brown, supra note 211, at 654 (“The Equal Protection Clause provides three
possible standards for courts to use when deciding on the constitutionality of juvenile
curfews: strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review.”). That the
Equal Protection Clause does not itself provide for the tiers of scrutiny to be applied
to equal protection challenges should be noted; rather, the tiers of scrutiny are a
judicially-created rubric.
222
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES 554
(4th ed. 2011) (“Strict scrutiny . . . is the most intensive type of judicial review.”).
223
Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) (per curiam).
224
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (opinion of Stone, J.).
225
See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (opinion of
Stewart, J.); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (opinion of White, J.).
See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 222, at 554 (“[L]aws generally are declared
unconstitutional when [strict scrutiny] is applied.”).
226
See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (opinion of Burger,
C.J.) (citing McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)
(opinion of Warren, C.J.).
227
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (opinion of
Ginsburg, J.) (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982));
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (opinion of Brennan, J.).
228
See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (opinion of O’Connor, J.).
229
See, e.g., Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (citing Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at
724).
230
See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
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3. Rational Basis Review
a. Traditional Rational Basis Review
Rational basis review is the most flexible standard under the equal
protection framework.231 Courts apply rational basis review to government
action which discriminates on the basis of age,232 among others. Under
rational basis review, courts defer to the legislature,233 and presume that
government action is valid.234 Thus, a court will strike down government
action only if it is not “rationally related to furthering a legitimate state
interest.”235
Rational basis review reflects a judicial awareness that legislatures cannot
avoid creating distinctions.236 However, critics of rational basis review argue
the high degree of judicial deference to legislatures militates toward upholding
discriminatory laws.237
b. Rational Basis Review “With Teeth”
Though rational basis review permits government action to incidentally
burden or operate to the disadvantage of a class of citizens, the Equal
Protection Clause forbids a legislative desire to do so.238 Thus, courts will
231

See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 222, at 694 (“The rational basis test is the minimal
level of scrutiny that all government actions challenged under equal protection must
meet.”).
232
See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 106, 111 (1979) (opinion of White, J.);
Mass. Bd. of Ret., 427 U.S. at 313-14.
233
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 222, at 696.
234
See Vance, 440 U.S. at 97 (citing San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 40 (1973)); Mass. Bd. of Ret., 427 U.S. at 314. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 222, at 553.
235
Vance, 440 U.S. at 97 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
236
Mass. Bd. of Ret., 427 U.S. at 314. See also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631
(1996) (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (“The Fourteenth Amendment's promise that no
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws must coexist with the
practical necessity that most legislation classifies for one purpose or another, with
resulting disadvantage to various groups or persons.”) (citations omitted).
237
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 222, at 696. But see Mass. Bd. of Ret., 427 U.S. at
314, 316 (stating that government action “does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect[,]” because
“[p]erfection in making the necessary classifications is neither possible nor
necessary.”) (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
238
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 633 (stating that rational basis review “ensure[s] that
classifications are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened
by the law.”). See also R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (“If the adverse impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the
legislature, its impartiality would be suspect.”).
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invalidate government action that burdens or operates to the disadvantage of a
class of citizens without advancing a legitimate state interest.239
In Romer v. Evans,240 for example, the Court reviewed a Colorado law that
prohibited executive, legislative, or judicial protection of homosexuals.241
Even under rational basis review, the Court invalidated the law because it
operated to achieve “respect for . . . the liberties of landlords or employers who
have personal or religious objections to homosexuality.”242 The Court
concluded the law was not rationally related to its stated purpose,243 because it
sought instead to disadvantage homosexuals.244
While the Court in Romer and Lawrence v. Texas245 invalidated laws within
the context of homosexual equality, these cases demonstrate the Court’s
propensity to apply a more stringent form of rational basis review to
government action which is traceable to a discriminatory purpose.246
However, constitutional review of juvenile curfew ordinances remains a
mystery: federal and state courts have applied different standards of scrutiny
to an equal protection challenge to juvenile curfews.
4. Inconsistent Analyses of Juvenile Curfew Ordinances
The Supreme Court has never heard a constitutional challenge to a juvenile
curfew ordinance on any grounds.247 Nevertheless, lower federal courts and
state courts alike have upheld or invalidated juvenile curfews under all three
standards of review.248 Some courts have argued a form of strict scrutiny
239

See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 635-36 (applying rational basis review, but striking
down a law which disadvantaged homosexuals); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448-49 (1985) (opinion of White, J.) (applying rational basis
review, but striking down a law which disadvantaged the mentally disabled); Dep’t
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (applying
rational basis review, but striking down a law which disadvantaged households with
an individual unrelated to any other person in the household).
240
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
241
Id. at 624.
242
Id. at 635.
243
Id. (concluding the challenged law “inflict[ed] . . . immediate, continuing, and
real injuries that outrun and belie any legitimate justifications.”).
244
Id. at 634-35 (concluding the challenged law was “born of animosity toward
[homosexuals]”). See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (hypothesizing that a Texas law which criminalized homosexual
activity violated the Equal Protection Clause “under any standard of review.”).
245
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
246
Cf. Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 270, 932 A.2d 571, 601 (2007) (opinion of
Harrell, J.) (“The test to evaluate whether a facially gender-neutral statute
discriminates on the basis of sex is whether the law can be traced to a discriminatory
purpose.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
247
See Privor, supra note 202, at 418-19.
248
See Chudy, supra note 202, at 555 & n.290.
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should be applied;249 others have advocated for rational basis review;250 and
some commentators have argued intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate
standard.251
B. THE CURFEW’S AGE-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS: COMPARING RATIONAL
BASIS REVIEW AGAINST INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
Supreme Court precedent dictates that rational basis review is the
appropriate standard to which Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew ordinance
must be subjected, insofar as the curfew facially classifies on the basis of
age.252 The threshold argument, therefore, centers on whether the curfew’s
age-based classification should be subject to a form of rational basis review or
intermediate scrutiny.253 The appropriate standard of scrutiny to apply to the
curfew’s age-based classification is an important issue;254 it likely will
determine the curfew’s constitutional validity.
1. Legitimate and Important Government Interests: Reducing Juvenile
Crime and Victimization
The Supreme Court has recognized that minors’ well-being is a compelling
state interest.255 Within the context of a juvenile curfew, protecting a minor’s
“well-being” can be narrowed to mean reducing juvenile crime and juvenile

249

See, e.g., Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997); In re Appeal
in Maricopa Cnty., 887 P.2d 599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); City of Maquoketa v.
Russell, 484 N.W. 2d 179 (Iowa 1992); Brown v. Ashton, 93 Md. App. 25, 611 A.2d
599 (1992), rev’d, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447 (1995). See also Benjamin C. Sasse,
Note, Curfew Laws, Freedom of Movement, and the Rights of Juveniles, 50 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 681, 711 (2000) (citations omitted).
250
See, e.g., In re J.M., 768 P.2d 219 (Col. 1989); City of Panora v. Simmons, 445
N.W. 2d 363 (Iowa 1989).
251
See, e.g. Chudy, supra note 202, at 569-76.
252
See cases cited supra note 232.
253
Cf. Chudy, supra note 202, at 569-76.
254
See id. at 554.
255
See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 775-76 (1982) (opinion of White, J.)
(“It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in ‘safeguarding
the physical and psychological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling.’ ”) (citing
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)); Ginsburg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1968) (opinion of Brennan, J.) (“[T]he State has
an interest ‘to protect the welfare of children’ and to see that they are ‘safeguarded
from abuses’ which might prevent their ‘growth into free and independent welldeveloped men and citizens.’ ”) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165
(1944)); Prince, 321 U.S. at 168 (“A democratic society rests, for its continuance,
upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens.”).
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victimization.256 Thus, the Baltimore City Council’s interest in reducing
juvenile crime and juvenile victimization is a significant and legitimate state
interest under intermediate scrutiny and rational basis review, respectively.257
The sole relevant issue, then, is to what degree does the curfew’s age
classification achieves its legislative purpose? Still, the City Council’s “claim
of paternal concern should not deter the courts from critically examining” the
curfew’s age-based classification.258
2. Applying Rational Basis Review
The curfew baldly asserts the high volume and increase in severity of
crimes committed by juveniles,259 but the legislative history does not
substantiate this claim. Moreover, studies which demonstrate the effects of a
juvenile curfew on juvenile crime and victimization are few.260 Nevertheless,
the City Council’s assertion that it “suffer[s] from rampant juvenile crime and
victimization . . . may not appear entirely unfounded.”261
Contrarily, anchoring the curfew’s age-based classifications to the
statistical propensity for minors to commit crimes or become victims of them
creates a dangerous prospect that the curfew will be selectively enforced.262
African-Americans, for example, commit a statistically disproportionate
percentage of crimes.263 Nevertheless, the few courts264 which have decided
an equal protection challenge to a juvenile curfew under rational basis review
have upheld the curfew.265
256

See Chudy, supra note 202, at 557.
See Privor, supra note 202, at 455 (“The community’s desire to reduce juvenile
crime and victimization provides curfew ordinances with an unassailable
objective.”).
258
Assessing the Scope, supra note 201, at 1168-69 (citing Irene Merker Rosenberg,
The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to
the Not so Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 703-05 (1980)).
259
“An emergency has been created by a substantial increase in the number and in
the seriousness of crimes committed by minors against persons and property within
the City, and this has created a menace to the preservation of public peace, safety,
health, morals, and welfare.” BALT., MD. CODE – UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, §
34-2.
260
See Privor, supra note 202, at 464.
261
See id. at 457 (“The community’s desire to reduce juvenile crime and
victimization provides curfew ordinances with an unassailable objective.”).
262
See discussion infra Part II.C.3.
263
Privor, supra note 202, at 461 & n.263 (stating that, in 1995, African-Americans
were arrested for 35.7 percent of all serious crimes while accounting for a mere 12.6
percent of the population in the United States) (citations omitted).
264
See Brown, supra note 211, at 662 (“Few courts have used the rational basis
standard to review juvenile curfew ordinances.”).
265
See, e.g., Bykofsky, 401 F. Supp. at 1266; In re J.M., 768 P.2d at 223-24; City of
Panora, 445 N.W. 2d at 368-70.
257
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Given the lack of empirical evidence demonstrating that curfews are
rationally related to reducing juvenile crime and victimization, and the
persuasive authority from federal and state courts, a Maryland court likely will
uphold Baltimore’s juvenile curfew ordinance under rational basis review.
However, doubt remains that the curfew will be effective in achieving its stated
legislative purposes.266 Whether Baltimore’s curfew satisfies intermediate
scrutiny is less clear.
3. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny
Some commentators have suggested the time restrictions and age
classifications do not correlate with reducing juvenile crime or juvenile
victimization.267 For example, the court in Nunez v. City of San Diego268
considered evidence of juvenile crime and victimization for the year in which
San Diego began to enforce its curfew more aggressively.269 The evidence
demonstrated that merely fifteen percent of arrests were for violent juvenile
crimes, and that juvenile victimization increased, during curfew hours.270 The
court in Nunez struck down the curfew under strict scrutiny,271 holding the
curfew was “not narrowly tailored to minimize the burden on minors’
fundamental constitutional rights.”272 The Nunez court further concluded that
the City of San Diego “established some nexus between the curfew and its
compelling interest of reducing juvenile crime and victimization.”273
In contrast to Nunez, the court in Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville,274
considered evidence of a high juvenile crime rate and a substantial increase in
juvenile victimization. In Charlottesville, Virginia, juveniles committed
eighty-five percent of serious crimes in 1996.275 Moreover, juvenile crime
between 11 p.m. and 6 p.m. increased by thirty-eight percent in 1995, and by
an additional ten percent in 1996.276 The court in Schleifer upheld the curfew
under intermediate scrutiny,277 holding the curfew “represent[ed] the least
266

See Assessing the Scope, supra note 201, at 1177 n.69 (“[T]here is considerable
doubt that juvenile curfews are actually effective in reducing juvenile crime.”)
(citations omitted).
267
See, e.g., Chudy, supra note 202, at 558 (discussing defects in “time dimension”
and “age classifications”).
268
114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997).
269
In 1994, San Diego adopted a resolution to aggressively enforce its curfew, which
it had enacted in 1947. Id. at 946, 938-39.
270
Id. at 947.
271
Id. at 946.
272
Id. at 952.
273
Id. at 948 (emphasis added).
274
159 F.3d 843 (4th Cir. 1998).
275
Id. at 850.
276
Id.
277
Id. at 847.
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restrictive means to advance Charlottesville’s” interest in reducing juvenile
crime and victimization.278 Accordingly, the court posited that the curfew also
would satisfy strict scrutiny.279
The Nunez and Schleifer courts reached opposite holdings under different
standards of scrutiny. Perhaps the stark contrast in statistical data
demonstrating the rate of juvenile crime and victimization can reconcile these
two holdings.
Nevertheless, “statistical problems related to age
classifications” undermine the position that juvenile curfews effectively
reduce juvenile crime.280
In Hutchins v. District of Columbia,281 for example, the court considered
reports demonstrating juveniles to whom a Washington, D.C., curfew did not
apply—those who were at least seventeen years old—comprised forty-two
percent of all “juvenile referrals” between 1990 and 1994.282 The presumption
is, therefore, that juveniles who were sixteen years and under comprised fiftyeight percent of the city’s juvenile referrals. The reports, however, failed to
indicate the percentage of the city’s population which the curfew affected.283
The alarming rates of juvenile crime and victimization constitutionally
justified the imposition of a curfew in Schleifer. But statistical evidence which
demonstrates a more tenuous relationship between a curfew’s age-based
classification and a reduction in juvenile crime and victimization may not be
“substantially related” to the extent that it satisfies intermediate scrutiny.
4. Assessing the Curfew’s Effects on Reducing Juvenile Crime and
Victimization
The Mayor’s Office on Criminal Justice reported 398 curfew violations—
226 for the daytime curfew and 172 for the nighttime curfew—in the first
seven months since the curfew took effect.284 Among the 398 total violations,
only twenty-seven were repeat offenses285—a recidivism rate of only 7.3
percent. Moreover, the Office of the Mayor reported 120 curfew violations
during the first month in which the curfew was enforced,286 but just 278
278

Id. at 852.
Id.
280
Chudy, supra note 202, at 558.
281
188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
282
Id. at 542-45.
283
Id.
284
E-mail from Sulakshana Bhattacharya, Program Coordinator, Mayor’s Office on
Criminal Justice, City of Balt. to author (Feb. 26, 2015, 10:29 EST) (on file with
author).
285
Id.
286
Press Release, Office of the Mayor of Balt. City, Mayor Rawlings-Blake Releases
Curfew Violation Numbers (Sept. 11, 2014) (on file with author), available at
http://mayor.baltimorecity.gov/news/press-releases/2014-09-11-curfew-violationnumbers-released.
279
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violations during the subsequent six months287—a 61.4 percent decline in the
rate at which minors are violating the curfew. The low recidivism rate and a
marked drop-off in the quantity of curfew violations suggests the curfew
effectively keeps children off the streets.
These figures, however, are not necessarily indicative of the curfew’s
efficacy. They do not account for the number of number of juveniles who
violate the curfew during the commission of a crime. In such instances, police
will charge the minor with a crime, but will not issue a citation for violating
the curfew.288
Moreover, these figures, though facially indicative of a reduction in the
quantity of curfew violations, do not represent the degree or quality of parental
supervision. Assuming the curfew was enacted—at least in part—to
encourage or compel parents to take a more active role in raising their children,
these figures do not demonstrate the degree to which enforcing the curfew has
succeeded.289
Analyzing the curfew’s age-based classification under rational basis review
and intermediate scrutiny hinge on whether the daytime and night curfews will
achieve the Baltimore City Council’s interests in reducing juvenile crime and
delinquency. Strict scrutiny, however, requires a more searching inquiry into
the curfew’s underlying purposes.
C. THE CURFEW’S RACE-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS: TRIGGERING STRICT
SCRUTINY
Chief among the Fourteenth Amendment’s purposes “is the prevention of
official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”290 Baltimore City’s
juvenile curfew is facially neutral with respect to race,291 but there is a
possibility that it is “racist in intent or execution, or at least unfairly
burdensome to racial minorities.”292
287

Compare id., with E-mail from Sulakshana Bhattacharya, supra note 284.
Telephone Interview with Angela Johnese, Dir., Mayor’s Office on Criminal
Justice, City of Balt., and Sulakshana Bhattacharya, Program Coordinator, Mayor’s
Office on Criminal Justice, City of Balt. (Feb. 25, 2015).
289
See supra notes 171, 194 and accompanying text.
290
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (opinion of White, J.). See also
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens.”); In re Legislative Districting of State, 299 Md. 658, 673, 475 A.2d 428,
435 (1982) (per curiam).
291
See generally BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, subtit. 34.
292
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), Justice Matthews stated:
288

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, . . . if it is applied and administered . . . with an evil
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and
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1. Triggering Strict Scrutiny for Facially Neutral Laws
There are two components to triggering strict scrutiny for a facially neutral
law: proving the law’s purpose and its effects are racially discriminatory.293
The Supreme Court has not expressly stated that triggering strict scrutiny
requires demonstrating a facially neutral law’s racially discriminatory
purposes and effects.294 However, Washington v. Davis295 and Palmer v.
Thompson,296 read together, suggest that demonstrating both discriminatory
purpose and effects is necessary to trigger strict scrutiny.297 Yet, such a
illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances,
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within
the prohibition of the Constitution.
Id. at 373-374. See also Note, Juvenile Curfews and the Major Confusion Over
Minor Rights, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2400, 2404 (2005) (citing Privor, supra note 202,
at 420-21 (“[S]ome courts may be only a small step away from accepting selective
enforcement of effectively race-based curfews[.]”)); Note, Juvenile Curfews and
Gang Violence: Exiled on Main Street, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1707 (1994)
(“Once curfews are imposed, the burden falls disproportionately on minority
individuals and communities.”).
293
Compare McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (opinion of Powell, J.)
(stating a defendant eligible to receive the death penalty “would have to prove the
Georgia Legislature enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an
anticipated racially discriminatory effect.”) (emphasis in original), and Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.) (“[O]nly if there is
purposeful discrimination can there be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”)
(citations omitted), with Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 (“Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant[.]”), and Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 266 (1971) (White, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he reality is that the impact of the city's act falls on the minority. . . .
[T]here are deep and troubling effects on the racial minority that should give us all
pause.”).
294
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 222, at 730.
295
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
296
403 U.S. 217 (1971) (opinion of Black, J.).
297
In Davis, Justice White stated: “Disproportionate impact . . . is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination[.] . . . Standing alone, it does not
trigger the rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny[.]
. . . ” Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
In Palmer, Justice Black stated:
[N]o case in this Court has held that a legislative act may violate
equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men who
voted for it. . . . If the law is struck down for this reason, rather than
because of its facial content or effect, it would presumably be valid
as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for
different reasons.
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distillation of Davis and Palmer,298 undermines the original purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause—to prevent government action from discriminating
on the basis of race.299
The Equal Protection Clause forbids purposeful discrimination.
Accordingly, a law is constitutionally invalid when its race-based
classifications are unnecessary to achieve a compelling state interest.300 Thus,
a legislative body cannot have a compelling state interest in a law when the
law’s purpose is to discriminate on the basis of race, rather than to use a racebased classification to achieve some other compelling state interest.301
Even if the face of a law does not reveal a racially discriminatory purpose,
the law’s racially disproportionate effects are prima facie evidence of a
legislative body’s constitutionally impermissible objective.302 Because the
distinctions between the two are vague,303 proving a racially discriminatory
purpose presents its own challenges.304

Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224-25.
298
See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (opinion of
Rehnquist, C.J.) (stating that “[t]he claimant must demonstrate” discriminatory effect
and purpose of the race-based prosecution to prove an equal protection violation).
299
See cases cited supra notes 290, 292, and accompanying text.
300
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 222, at 730.
301
See id.
302
See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266
(1977) (opinion of Powell, J.) (“The impact of the official action—whether it ‘bears
more heavily on one race than another,’—may provide an important starting point.”)
(quoting Davis, 426 U.S. at 242). See also Larry G. Simon, Racially Prejudiced
Government Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial
Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041, 1111 (1978) (“[A] showing of
significant disproportionate disadvantage to a racial minority group, without more,
gives rise to an inference that the action may have been taken or at least maintained
or continued with knowledge that such groups would be relatively disadvantaged. . .
[I]t raises a possibility sufficient to oblige the government to come forward with a
credible explanation showing that the action was (or would have been) taken apart
from prejudice.”).
303
See Davis, 426 U.S. at 254 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[T]he line between
discriminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not . . . bright.”).
304
See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224. “First, it is extremely difficult for a court to
ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind a
legislative enactment.” Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84
(1968) (opinion of Warren, C.J.)). “Furthermore, there is an element of futility in a
judicial attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters.” Id.
at 225.
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2. Proving Racially Discriminatory Purpose
A statistical pattern of racially discriminatory effect might be apparent to
the extent that it cannot be explained “on grounds other than race,”305 though
“such cases are rare.”306 The law’s historical background,307 the “sequence of
events leading up to”308 its promulgation,309 and the legislative or
administrative history are relevant to proving a racially discriminatory
purpose.310
A challenge to a law on the grounds of impermissible race discrimination
that proves both racially discriminatory effect and purpose places the burden
of proof on the government.311 The government must then show it would have
promulgated the challenged law absent a racially discriminatory purpose.312
The legislative history of Baltimore’s curfew does not mention race;313
therefore proving a racially discriminatory purpose underlies the curfew is
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Thus, triggering strict scrutiny relies
upon the curfew’s racially discriminatory effects.
3. Proving Racially Discriminatory Impact
a. The Youth Connection Centers: “The pattern surrounding curfew
laws has been to enact them in blighted, poor, urban areas[.]”314
Baltimore City operates two Youth Connection Centers.315 The Lillian
Jones Recreation Center316 is located in the Sandtown-Winchester
neighborhood in West Baltimore; Collington Square Community Recreation
Center317 is located in the Broadway East neighborhood in East Baltimore.
305

Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (citations omitted).
Id.
307
Id. at 267 (citations omitted).
308
Id.
309
Id. (citations omitted).
310
Id. at 267.
311
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66 (“When there is a proof that a
discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial
deference is no longer justified.”).
312
See id. at 270 n.21 (stating in dicta that “[s]uch proof would, however, have
shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision would have
resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.”).
313
See generally BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, subtit. 34. See
also sources cited supra notes 188-91.
314
Orly Jashinsky, Liberty for All? Juvenile Curfews: Always An Unconstitutional
and Ineffective Solution, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 546, 574 (2007).
315
Press Release, Office of the Mayor of Balt. City, supra note 286.
316
1301 North Stricker Street. Id.
317
1409 North Patterson Park Avenue. Id.
306
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Both neighborhoods are noted for their economic depression, high crime rates,
and urban decay.
In Sandtown-Winchester and the eight bordering neighborhoods,318 97.9
percent of the residents are of a minority race, including 95.6 percent who are
African-American; 2.1 percent are white; 25.6 percent are seventeen years old
or younger; and a single parent is at the head of 34.7 percent of the
households.319 In Broadway East and the six bordering neighborhoods,320 96.5
percent of the residents are of a minority race, including 93.3 percent who are
African-American; 3.5 percent are white; 26.7 percent are seventeen years old
or younger; and a single parent is at the head of 34.6 percent of the
households.321 Collectively, in the two neighborhoods in which Baltimore
City operates its Youth Connection Centers, 97.4 percent of the residents are
of a minority race, including 94.8 percent who are African-American; 2.6
percent are white; 26.0 percent are seventeen years old or younger; and a single
parent is at the head of 34.7 percent of the households.322
b. Enforcing the Curfew Against Minority Children
Any success the curfew might have in achieving its purposes is not without
racial its disproportions. Among 371 unique curfew violators, 314 were black
318

Penn North, Druid Heights, Upton, Harlem Park, Midtown-Edmonson,
Bridgewood/Greenlawn, Easterwood, and Mondawmin.
319
See ALISA AMES ET AL., BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011 NEIGHBORHOOD
HEALTH PROFILE: SANDTOWN-WINCHESTER/HARLEM PARK 3-4 (2011), available at
http://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/47%20Sandtown.pdf; ALISA AMES
ET AL., BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011 NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH PROFILE: PENN
NORTH/RESERVOIR HILL 3-4 (2011), available at http://health.baltimorecity.gov/
sites/default/files/43%20Penn%20North.pdf; ALISA AMES ET AL., BALT. CITY
HEALTH DEP’T, 2011 NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH PROFILE: GREATER MONDAWMIN 3-4
(2011), available at http://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/21%20Greater
%20Mondawmin.pdf; ALISA AMES ET AL., BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011
NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH PROFILE: GREATER ROSEMONT 3-4 (2011), available at
http://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/ 23%20Greater%20Rosemont.pdf.
320
Clifton Park, Berea, Biddle Street, Middle East, Gay Street, and Oliver.
321
See ALISA AMES ET AL., BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011 NEIGHBORHOOD
HEALTH PROFILE: GREENMOUNT EAST 3-4 (2011), available at http://health.
baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/24%20Greenmount.pdf; ALISA AMES ET AL.,
BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011 NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH PROFILE: CLIFTONBEREA 3-4 (2011), available at http://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/10%
20Clifton.pdf; ALISA AMES ET AL., BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011
NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH PROFILE: PERKINS/MIDDLE EAST 3-4 (2011), available at
http://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/44%20Perkins.pdf; ALISA AMES ET
AL., BALT. CITY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011 NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH PROFILE:
MADISON/EAST END 3-4 (2011), available at
http://health.baltimorecity.gov/sites/default/files/33%20Madison.pdf.
322
See sources cited supra notes 319 and 321.
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and forty were white.323 Black curfew violators, therefore, account for 84.6
percent of all curfew violations, whereas white curfew violators account for
only 10.8 percent.
The empirical evidence demonstrated is analogous to that in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins.324 The Supreme Court in Yick Wo struck down a San Francisco
ordinance which prohibited laundries from being located in wooden buildings,
unless a waiver was obtained.325 All 240 Chinese-Americans who applied for
the waiver were denied. Meanwhile, seventy-nine of eighty applications for
waiver by non-Chinese individuals were accepted.
One reading of Yick Wo is that 99.6 percent of denied applications belonged
to Chinese-Americans. Another reading of Yick Wo is that the restriction was
enforced against 75.0 percent of those subject to the ordinance. The lower
figure is more analogous to Baltimore City’s curfew, which, the numbers
demonstrate, is five times more likely to burden a black child than a child of
another race.
Race neutrality on the curfew’s face notwithstanding, the empirical
disparities are–or should be, at least–sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny.
Proving the curfew’s racially discriminatory purpose from its effects on
minorities, particularly African-Americans, is a heavy burden to carry.
Indeed, more data is needed. Nevertheless, an inquiry into the issue, and into
whether enforcing the curfew achieves the Baltimore City Council’s interests,
will ensure the curfew comports with the Equal Protection Clause.
III. APPLYING THE EQUAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK TO BALTIMORE
CITY’S JUVENILE CURFEW
The constitutional validity of Baltimore City’s curfew centers on the
threshold issues for each of the curfew’s classifications. First, whether the
curfew’s age-based classifications should be subject to intermediate scrutiny,
rational basis review “with teeth,” or traditional rational basis review. Second,
whether the racially disproportionate effects apparent from the curfew’s
enforcement patterns trigger strict scrutiny. Judicial disposition of the
threshold issue will all but dictate whether the curfew will survive an equal
protection attack.326
The dispositive issue will be the degree to which the daytime and nighttime
curfews advance or achieve the Baltimore City Council’s explicit interests—
reducing juvenile crime, victimization, and delinquency—and its implicit
323

E-mail from Sulakshana Bhattacharya, supra note 284. Seventeen violators were
of an unidentified race. Id.
324
118 U.S. 356 (1886) (opinion of Matthews, J.).
325
Id. at 374.
326
See Patryk J. Chudy, Note, Doctrinal Reconstruction: Reconciling Conflicting
Standards in Adjudicating Juvenile Curfew Challenges, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 518,
554 (2000).
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interests—encouraging parents to take a more proactive role in raising their
children.
A. RECONCILING THE CURFEW’S CLASSIFICATIONS WITH THE STANDARDS
OF REVIEW
Determining the constitutional validity of the curfew’s age- and race-based
classifications327 are separate analyses.328 Indeed, they are subject to different
standards of scrutiny.329
With respect to the curfew’s age-based
classifications, a balance between traditional rational basis review and rational
basis review “with teeth”330 cannot discount the burdens and disadvantages
that are unique to African-American children and their parents.331
Choosing the most appropriate standard of scrutiny to apply to the curfew’s
age-based classifications requires more evidence of the curfew’s racially
disproportionate effects.332 Considering the empirical evidence currently
327

See discussion supra Parts II.B-C. See also BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED
ARTICLES art. 19, §§ 34-1(d), 34-3(b), 34-3(c) (Balt. City Dep’t of Legislative
Reference 2015), available at
http://archive.baltimorecity.gov/portals/0/charter%20and%20Codes/code/Art%2019
%20-%20PoliceOrds.pdf.
328
See discussion supra Parts II.A.1-3.
329
Compare discussion supra Part II.A.1., with discussion supra Part II.A.3.a..
330
Compare discussion supra Part II.A.3.a., with discussion supra Part II.a.3.b.
331
See Leslie Joan Harris, An Empirical Study of Parental Responsibility Laws:
Sending Messages, but What Kind and To Whom?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 5, 10
(“[C]ritics express concern that laws will be enforced mostly against poor, single
parents, especially African-American women.”) (citations omitted). Cf. Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
332
Section 34-10 provides:
The Mayor and City Council shall continue evaluating and updating
this subtitle through methods including but not limited to:
(1) Annually, on or before February 1 of each year, the Police
Commissioner must report to the Mayor and City Council:
(i) on the effect of this subtitle on crimes committed by and
against minors;
(ii) the number of warnings issued and arrests of minors,
parents, and operators hereunder; and
(iii) such other information as the Mayor and City Council
may request.
(2) On a regular basis, the Mayor and City Council shall receive
informal requests of all exceptional cases hereunder and advisory
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available,333 a heightened form of rational basis review is the most appropriate
standard under which the curfew must be reviewed.334 If, on the other hand,
any additional evidence is sufficient to prove a racially discriminatory purpose
behind the curfew, strict scrutiny is the appropriate—indeed, the required—
standard.335 Under any standard of review, the dispositive issue is the degree
to which the classification advances the curfew’s purposes.
B. ACCURATELY ASSESSING REDUCTIONS IN JUVENILE CRIME AND
VICTIMIZATION
The quantity of curfew violations has decreased markedly since the curfew
took effect in August 2014.336 However, the police department’s enforcement
strategies do not include specifically targeting minors.337 Instead, police detain
a minor believed to be in violation of the curfew merely during the course of
their routine patrol.338
Moreover, police have not issued a single citation to a parent,339 nor does
the city keep records of parents who voluntarily attend family counseling
sessions.340 The lack of data pertaining to the curfew’s enforcement creates
two interrelated impossibilities.
First, ascertaining the “true” number of curfew violations on a daily,
weekly, or monthly basis is impossible.341 This failure, in addition to the City
opinions for consideration in further updating and continuing
evaluate of this subtitle.
BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES art. 19, § 34-10.
The author’s repeated attempts to obtain information required to be submitted to
the mayor have proved fruitless.
333
See discussion supra Part II.B.4.
334
Rational basis review “with teeth” reflects a compromise between traditional
rational basis review and intermediate scrutiny. See Chudy, supra note 326, at 56976 (arguing intermediate scrutiny is the standard of review applicable in the context
of a juvenile curfew ordinance). See also discussion supra Parts II.A.2 and II.A.3.a.
335
See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
336
Compare Press Release, Office of the Mayor of Balt. City, Mayor RawlingsBlake Releases Curfew Violation Numbers (Sept. 11, 2014) (on file with author),
available at http://mayor.baltimorecity.gov/news/press-releases/2014-09-11-curfewviolation-numbers-released, with Telephone Interview with Angela Johnese, Dir.,
Mayor’s Office on Criminal Justice, City of Balt., and Sulakshana Bhattacharya,
Program Coordinator, Mayor’s Office on Criminal Justice, City of Balt. (Feb. 25,
2015).
337
Telephone Interview with Angela Johnese and Sulakshana Bhattacharya, supra
note 336.
338
Id.
339
Id.
340
Id.
341
See also Harris, supra note 331, at 22 (suggesting curfews are rarely or never
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Council’s implicit legislative policies,342 further suggests the curfew is less
about reductions in juvenile crime and victimization, and more about forcing
parents to use city-approved resources.343
The true purpose behind the curfew inevitably links to the second
impossibility inherent in the curfew’s enforcement strategy. The city cannot
determine the degree to which parental supervision has improved. Here, as
with deciding on an appropriate standing of scrutiny, more data is needed, but
is unavailable.344
The city, in order to assess accurately whether its curfew advances its
explicit and implicit goals, must not rely on merely anecdotal evidence.345
Instead, it must acquire conclusive data showing first, a pre- and post-curfew
statistical comparison of the juvenile crime and victimization rates,346 and the
rate at which school-aged children are absent from school. Second, acquired
data must conclusively show a clear point at which parents begin to take a
more proactive role in raising their children.347

enforced).
342
See discussion supra Part I.D.2.
343
See Interview with Brandon Scott, Councilman, Balt. City Council, in Balt., Md.
(Aug. 5, 2015) (notes on file with author); BALT., MD., CODE - UNREVISED ARTICLES
art. 19, § 34-9(a)(1)(i).
344
See Interview with Brandon Scott, supra note 343.
345
“I've been there and seen the [four]-year-old come in. I've had a little child tell
me they got caught on purpose so they can eat. I've seen how young these children
are [who] come into the center [who] are out unaccompanied, and that is
unacceptable.” Julia Botero, For Their Own Good? New Curfew Sends Baltimore
Kids Home Early, NPR (Aug. 31, 2014, 1:33 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2014/08/31/344643559/for-their-own-good-new-curfew-sendsbaltimore-kids-home-early (quoting Brandon Scott, the city councilman who
sponsored the curfew bill).
346
Violent crimes and juvenile arrests rates in Baltimore are declining. Lauren
Gambino, Outrage follows Baltimore’s ‘deeply flawed’ youth curfew decision, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2014, 9:56 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/12/-sp-baltimore-city-council-youthcurfew. Nevertheless, high rates of drug crimes and gang violence—more
pronounced in the city’s minority and low-income neighborhoods—continue to
plague the city. Id.
347
Brian Privor, Article, Dusk ‘Til Dawn: Children’s Rights and the Effectiveness of
Juvenile Curfew Ordinances, 79 B.U. L. REV. 415, 464 (1999) (explaining that
empirical studies concluding whether juvenile curfews effectively reduce crime and
victimization are scant).
For a current, comprehensive report showing juvenile crime and victimization data
on a national scale, see NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND
VICTIMS: 2014 NATIONAL REPORT (Melissa Sickmund & Charles Puzzanchera eds.,
2014) (providing the most reliable information available through 2010), available at
http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/NR2014.pdf.
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Such data, however, is useful only to the extent that an equal protection
analysis of the curfew will subject it to a standard of review other than strict
scrutiny. Indeed, the curfew is not the only means by which the city can reduce
juvenile crime and victimization.
C. PROPOSING ALTERNATIVE MEANS TO ADVANCE OR ACHIEVE THE
CURFEW’S UNDERLYING POLICIES
The few studies and other research that are available do little to show the
effects of juvenile curfews on reducing juvenile crime and victimization.348
One national study concluded violent crime will decrease by a mere ten
percent in the first year, with only marginal decreases in subsequent years.349
Other studies demonstrate that there is no correlation between curfews and a
reduction in juvenile crime and victimization.350 Given the uncertainties
surrounding the efficacy of juvenile curfews, the Baltimore City Council must
consider a host of alternative means by which it can more effectively advance
or achieve its explicit and implicit interests.

348

See generally Kenneth Adams, Cynthia M. Lum, Anthony Petrosino, & David
Weisburd, Assessing Systematic Evidence in Crime and Justice: Methodological
Concerns and Empirical Outcomes (sec. 2), 587 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 136 (2003). See also Gambino, supra note 346 (“[Curfews] are a tool in a
toolbox that needs to include social services, access to education, access to economic
improvement and healthcare, because the youth who are most at risk for committing
crimes are living in communities that are disenfranchised.”) (quoting Nadine
Connell, assistant professor of criminology at the University of Texas at Dallas);
Justin Worland, Baltimore Tightens Curfew Amid Skepticism and Protests, TIME
(Aug. 8, 2014), http://time.com/3089931/baltimore-curfew/ (“It does[ not] reduce
crime. It does[ not] make communities safer. In fact what it might do is contribute to
the negative relationship between law enforcement and the communities they[ are]
looking to serve.”) (quoting Marie Williams, Executive Director of the Coalition for
Juvenile Justice); Emma Fitzsimmons, Baltimore Joins Cities Toughening Curfews,
Citing Safety but Eliciting Concern, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2014), http://www.nytime
s.com/2014/06/22/us/baltimore-joins-cities-toughening-curfews-citing-safety-buteliciting-concern.html (“These are usually short-term measures. They tend to have
bursts of enforcement, and then they tend to give up.”) (quoting Patrick Kline, an
economics professor at the University of California, Berkeley, who has studied
curfew laws).
349
See Botero, supra note 345.
350
See Gambino, supra note 346; Yvonne Wenger & Colin Campbell, Baltimore's
new curfew takes effect Friday, BALTIMORE SUN (Aug. 7, 2014),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-08-07/news/bs-md-ci-curfew-effective20140806_1_curfew-collington-square-recreation-center-sandtown-winchester.
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1. Employing the Kids
Baltimore City and “leaders of the business and philanthropic
communities”351 sponsor YouthWorks,352 an initiative designed to offer
summer jobs to the city’s youth.353 The program’s popularity, wide-ranging
opportunities, and its benefactors’ financial commitment ensure its continued
success, which has been “nationally-recognized.”354
YouthWorks seeks to provide 5,000 of the city’s teenagers and young
adults with paid summer employment opportunities.355 In 2015, however, a
record 8,000 hopeful participants registered.356 Perhaps YouthWorks’
diversity of employment opportunities drives its popularity.
YouthWorks offers jobs in the professional and civil service industries,
including in the health,357 journalism,358 legal,359 and public sectors.360 Other
fields include construction,361 higher education,362 science and technology,363
and tourism and hospitality.364
Moreover, eight city government agencies365 and a number of private and
non-profit business entities fund the program.366 Thus, the joint financial
commitment ensures the city-sponsored program will continue to operate.
351

Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Balt., Mayor Rawlings-Blake
Announces Expansion of Summer Jobs Program for Baltimore City Youth (June 24,
2015) (on file with author), available at http://mayor.baltimorecity.gov/news/pressreleases/2015-06-24-mayor-rawlings-blake-announces-expansion-summer-jobsprogram.
352
For additional information about YouthWorks, see YOUTHWORKS,
https://youthworks.oedworks.com/.
353
See Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Balt., supra note 351.
354
See id.
355
See id.
356
See id.
357
Johns Hopkins Hospital and Health Systems, and Mercy Medical Center. See id.
358
Baltimore Sun Media Group. See id.
359
Law Firm of Schlachman, Belsky and Weiner. See Press Release, Office of the
Mayor, City of Balt., supra note 351.
360
Baltimore City Police Department and the Enoch Pratt Free Library. See id.
361
Whiting Turner. See id.
362
Johns Hopkins University and Maryland Institute College of Art. See id.
363
Space Telescope Science Institute and the Maryland Department of Natural
Resources. See id.
364
Royal Sonesta Harbor Court Hotel and the National Aquarium. See id.
365
Baltimore City Department of Public Works, Baltimore City Health Department,
Baltimore City Housing Authority, Baltimore City Police Department, Office of
Civil Rights and Wage Enforcement, Baltimore City Council President’s Office,
Baltimore City Council Sharon Middleton District #6, and Baltimore City Council
Helen Holton District #8. See Press Release, Office of the Mayor, City of Balt.,
supra note 351.
366
See id.
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2. Incorporating the Curfew into the Juvenile Justice System
Assuming that enforcement of Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew cannot
reduce juvenile crime and victimization, or decrease delinquency from school,
then the juvenile crime, victimization, and delinquency rates will remain
steady—or worse, they will rise. Those rates will continue to propel minors
into the city’s juvenile justice system, and courts inevitably will sentence them
to a term of probation.
Imposing the curfew’s daytime and nighttime restrictions as a condition of
a juvenile’s probation will not guarantee a drop in juvenile crime,
victimization, or delinquency. More importantly, however, imposing the
curfew’s restrictions on a juvenile probationer will not unduly burden lawabiding children, who already live in an increasingly violent city,367 and who
regularly attend school.
3. Continuing to Develop Robust Recreation Programs
The Baltimore City Council must allocate money and other resources to
support neighborhood recreation centers368 and competitive sports leagues for
children who want or need a constructive activity in which they can participate
when they are not in school.
Baltimore City Councilman Carl Stokes, who voted against the curfew,369
argued the city should place greater emphasis on developing programs rather
than imposing punitive measures.370 Competitive sports leagues, for example,
367

See supra note 177.
Even though some are supportive of the policies underlying the curfew, they
doubt it would be necessary if the city appropriated more resources to its recreation
centers and after-school and summer activities for children. See Wenger &
Campbell, supra note 350.
In 2013, Baltimore City mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake closed twenty of the
city’s fifty-five recreation centers. See Gary Gately, Baltimore’s Newly Approved
Youth Curfew Among Strictest in Nation, JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION
EXCHANGE (June 16, 2014), http://jjie.org/baltimores-newly-approved-youth-curfewamong-strictest-in-nation/. But cf. Yvonne Wenger, Rawlings-Blake outlines four
broad goals for remainder of term, BALTIMORE SUN (Sept. 14, 2015 7:13 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-rawlingsblake-interview-20150914-story.html (reporting mayor Rawlings-Blake’s goal to
finance $136 million in improvements to community recreation centers and pools).
369
See Luke Broadwater, Council approves tough new curfew for city youths,
BALTIMORE SUN (May 12, 2014, 8:24 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-curfew-20140512-story.html.
370
See Baltimore’s Tough Curfew Law Takes Effect, CBSLOCAL.COM (Aug. 8, 2014,
6:22 AM), http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/08/08/baltimores-tough-curfew-lawtakes-effect-today/ (updated Aug. 9, 2014, 9:53 AM).
Stokes went on the record calling the curfew “a false effort to avoid the more
obvious proactive methods we should be using to engage young people, encourage
368
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are structured environments which would enrich the lives of the city’s youth
while simultaneously providing the adult supervision the curfew seeks to
encourage.371 These proposals, and others,372 present little risk, because they
have already proved to be effective.
4. Adopting Boston’s Strategy
Boston has reduced juvenile crime by creating a “community-based
approach” to occupy minors’ time with alternative activities.373 Boston’s
model is a three-pronged attack on juvenile crime and victimization:
prevention, intervention, and enforcement. 374
Boston’s prevention strategy, for example, operates programs which
provide employment opportunities375 for the city’s youth.376 Moreover,
several of Boston’s community-based initiatives target violent behavior
among children, and seek to prevent and eliminate it.377 When children find
themselves in court after engaging in violent behavior, probation officers take
a proactive approach to enforce the terms of juvenile offenders’ probation.378

them and give them opportunities for growth.” Id. Stokes further pleaded “[t]he
conversation should be about opportunities for young people, not about what
punishment we give a few young people.” See Lowell Melser, New Baltimore
curfew law sparks controversy, WBALTV.COM (June 4, 2014, 7:40 AM),
http://www.wbaltv.com/news/new-baltimore-curfew-law-sparkscontroversy/26310430.
371
See Gately, supra note 368.
Marvin “Doc” Cheatham, a longtime civil rights leader in Baltimore, recognizes
“[m]any of our adults need training; they do[ not] know how to be parents. . . . You[
have] got children raising children. . . . We have a problem with parental issues and
we need programs to better teach our parents how to be better parents.” Id.
Cheatham advocates for the city to expand recreation opportunities for children,
pointing out that men in the West Baltimore community for which he serves as
president of the community association are willing to coach sports and teach children
to read. Id.
372
For additional proposals, see AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MD., SUPPORTING
BALTIMORE’S YOUNG PEOPLE TO BE SAFE: AN ALTERNATE PLAN TO THE EXPANSION
OF BALTIMORE’S YOUTH CURFEW (2014), available at http://aclumd.org/uploaded_files/0000/0527/baltimore_youth_alternate_plan_5_28_14.pdf.
373
See Orly Jashinsky, Liberty for All? Juvenile Curfews: Always An
Unconstitutional and Ineffective Solution, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 546, 547
n.192 (2007) (citing Boston Police Dep’t & Partners, The Boston Strategy to Prevent
Youth Violence, Prevention, Intervention, and Enforcement 12 (1997)).
374
See Privor, supra note 347, at 476.
375
See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
376
See Privor, supra note 347, 481.
377
See id. at 478.
378
See id. at 477-78.
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Boston’s approach to reducing juvenile crime and victimization has proved to
be successful379 in a city which does not have a juvenile curfew in force.380
Notwithstanding the standard of scrutiny a court chooses to apply to an
equal protection challenge to Baltimore City’s juvenile curfew, the wisdom
behind the curfew deserves to be tested. Better still, regardless of any
challenge in court to the curfew, the city’s chosen method of reducing juvenile
crime, victimization, and delinquency, and encouraging parents to take a more
proactive role in raising their children, must be challenged.
CONCLUSION
The Baltimore City Council enacted a juvenile curfew ordinance, the
language of which stated that its restrictions on a minor’s presence in public
during certain hours will reduce juvenile crime, victimization, and
delinquency. The curfew’s language did not state that it will incentivize
parents to become more active in, and take more responsibility for, raising
their children. Nevertheless, the City Council’s interest in parents doing just
that is no less than its interests in seeing a drop in the juvenile crime,
victimization, and delinquency rates. That the City Council took pains to
explicate its interests underlying the curfew, but did not explicate all of its
interests, is worthy of concern.
The curfew’s enforcement patterns result in racially disproportionate effects
which disadvantage minorities, particularly African-Americans. More
evidence is necessary to demonstrate that the curfew’s two age-based
classifications were intended to target minority children in their parents.
Moreover, such evidence is necessary, yet inexplicably unavailable, to
prove the curfew’s age-based classifications unduly burden minorities. The
curfew will, therefore, survive an equal protection attack on grounds of age
discrimination, even under a rational basis review “with teeth” standard. Still,
the curfew is vulnerable to an equal protection attack on grounds of race
discrimination.
Mounting a successful equal protection attack to the curfew’s racially
disproportionate effects hinges on triggering strict scrutiny. Because the
curfew does not facially draw race-based distinctions, strict scrutiny will apply
only upon proof of the curfew’s racially discriminatory purpose and effects.
The daytime and nighttime curfews can survive strict scrutiny only if they are
necessary to reduce the juvenile crime, victimization, and delinquency rates,
and to provide children with needed parental support.
However, what data and other objective evidence that are available does
nothing to demonstrate that Baltimore City’s juvenile crime, victimization,
and delinquency rates have dropped, or that the curfew’s restrictions have
caused them to drop. Further still, the alternative means proposed in Part III,
379

See id. 475 (providing statistical data indicating a dramatic drop in juvenile
victimization).
380
See id. at 474 (citation omitted).
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by which the City Council can more effectively reach the goals the curfew
seeks to advance or achieve, show the curfew’s restrictions are not necessary.
Thus, bringing a successful equal protection challenge to the curfew’s
racially disproportionate effects depends only on whether objective evidence
of such effects are sufficient to prove a racially discriminatory purpose behind
the curfew. Although already apparent from the curfew’s enforcement
patterns, more objective evidence of the curfew’s racially disproportionate
effects is needed to prove a racially discriminatory purpose. Once the evidence
triggers strict scrutiny, the curfew’s needlessness and ineffectiveness will keep
it from surviving strict scrutiny.

